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Abstract 
 
Recently the Norwegian government decided to open even more blocks in the Barents Sea, 
and this enables more business activity. The last two years the level of major accidents in the 
petroleum industry has increased. With both national as well as international actors exploring, 
developing, and producing petroleum in Norwegian offshore area, more knowledge about risk 
is needed. The aim of this study is to explore how petroleum companies identifies and 
manages critical risks in the Norwegian Barents Sea. The research question is therefore as 
follows: How does petroleum companies identify and manage critical risks in the Norwegian 
Barents Sea? Two problem statements are addressed: 1) How does petroleum companies 
approach enterprise risk management and how are risk identified, and 2) What strategic risks 
are perceived to be critical and how are they managed. I will be using a comparative case 
study with two petroleum companies, one domestic and one international. The study includes 
four in-depth interviews, two from each company. The study shows that both companies 
seems to have a holistic approach to ERM and that risk identification occurs in two forms; 
deliberate and accidental. Two distinct strategic risks are identified as critical; reputational 
and political risks. The study also shows that critical risks are handled in a long-term and 
short-term manner. To help prevent major disasters in the Norwegian Arctic offshore sector 
this study is making emphasize on identifying strategic risk and managing them in accordance 
with company strategy.    
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Chapter 1. Introduction  
This chapter makes an introduction to the study of identifying and managing risks in the 
Barents Sea by illuminating how risks in the Arctic as a whole seems to be important and 
highly relevant. This chapter will illustrate why risks in petroleum activities in the Barents 
Sea are highly actual. Following is an illustration of the foundation for this thesis’ research 
question and its two problem statements used to complete the main aim. Finally, a structure of 
this thesis is provided.   
 
1.1  Risks in petroleum activities in the Barents Sea 
The physical environment in the Arctic seems to raise high stakes for companies that explore 
and develop oil and gas resources in this demanding area. And as the area is little explored 
compared to other petroleum areas in the world and with little competence on how the harsh 
climate might affect equipment, technology, and people working this environment, raises the 
risk of accidents happening. The already existing standards and best practices might not be 
suitable nor for the Arctic. Worries have been expressed that even though standards and 
practices are adapted to reduce the level of risk “accidents will happen and best practices will 
not always be followed.” (Arctic Council, 2009). A recent study by the Norwegian Petroleum 
Safety Authority (PSA) shows that there has been an increase in unexpected accidents on the 
Norwegian continental shelf the past two years. The Norwegian authority have therefore 
initiated a larger project to “Reverse the trend”. Focus areas which PSA has decided to 
emphasize is inter-party collaboration, standardization, and robustness (Ptil, 2017a).  
 
The Barents Sea in the North of Norway provides a commercial ground for petroleum activities 
in the Arctic.  To such challenges occurs, and particularly as the experience is minor. The 
Barents Sea area is undergoing its first steps in developing oil and gas in the Arctic, and 
challenges from this area might be used as an example for developing usage of resources in 
other areas of the Arctic. “It has been a natural step for the Norwegian oil industry to expand 
into the Arctic offshore, as 30% of the undiscovered Norwegian petroleum resources are 
expected to be in the Barents Sea” (Hasle, et al., 2009). Acknowledging that there is oil and gas 
activities in the Arctic on Russian, Canadian and US territory, the Barents Sea is still viewed as 
the key position in the Arctic. With valuable development in the Arctic, cooperation across 
borders is important and needed to increase knowledge and competence exchange in common 
and safely development of resources. To strengthen Norway’s role as a responsible actor, the 
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Norwegian Government has put focus on development of knowledge and business, and 
international cooperation (Regjeringen.no, 2014). Norway has a successful petroleum history 
where the country has been a responsible actor through developing, using, and learning from 
experience. The petroleum industry has taken great pride in its role. National and international 
standards exist and the industry behave accordingly. As standards and norms change in the 
synergy of new knowledge and research and development the process is in such way dynamic, 
and the industry needs to respond accordingly.  This poses challenges as it influences the 
industry on different levels. Increasing focus on cooperation across borders and 
internationalization is part of this development. Cooperation concerning the petroleum industry 
needs to stay at the same across boarders regardless of political climate as well. “Nobody must 
be responsible for pursuing an activity unless they have an adequate grasp of the risk picture” 
(Midttun, 2017). 
 
Risk concerning climate change must be considered carefully especially in the Arctic areas as 
the consequences of actions are more sensitive and severe. The Norwegian Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy has suggested announcement of 93 blocks in the Norwegian Barents Sea 
in what is going to be the 24th licensing round (NRK, NTB, 2017). This signalize commitment 
for development of the High North and sustainment of long-term activity (Ibid.). The 
announcement has gained reactions from some organizations amongst other the Norwegian 
Environment Agency. Environmental challenges, climate considerations and social economic 
profitability are some of the factors they consider when they proclaim the announcement to be 
too wide-ranging- related to new knowledge regarding climate and preparedness challenges in 
that area (Haugan & Sandvær, 2017) 
 
1.2  Purpose and research question 
The PSA initiated the project “Risk Level project in Norwegian Petroleum” (referred to as 
RNNP) to assess risk and to illustrate risk level through statistics, engineering, and social 
science and monitoring safety performance (Skogdalen, et al., 2011). Risk due to major hazards, 
emergency preparedness challenges, injury risk, occupational illness risk, and risk perceptions 
and cultural factors were applied in the project (Vinnem, 2010, p. 771). The RNNP was initiated 
because of a need to assess actual conditions and developments in offshore operations (Vinnem, 
2010). The RNNP define a major accident “as an acute incident, such as a major 
discharge/emission or a fire/explosion, which immediately or subsequently causes several 
serious injuries and/or loss of human life, serious harm to the environment and/ord loss of 
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substantial assets” (PSA, u.d.). 80 percent of the total major risk accidents on the Norwegian 
shelf has happened in the timespan period 1996-2004 (PSA, u.d.) and the last two years the 
level of major accidents has increased (Petroleumstilsynet, 2017). The accident indicator is 
currently on an elevated level, and the increasing activity in the Norwegian Barents Sea may 
lead to even more accidents- accidents that can strike the whole petroleum industry. As this 
area is characterized by remoteness and lack of infrastructure, the demands for cooperation 
amongst the petroleum actors regarding logistics and preparedness is present. Operations in the 
Barents Sea requires high safety demands regarding technology and of the operations itself.  
 
Having the petroleum industry’s challenges in mind the overall aim of this thesis is to study 
how petroleum companies identify and manage risks in the Barents Sea. The following research 
question has been the foundation for this study:  
 
“How does petroleum companies identify and manage critical risks in the Barents Sea?” 
 
Many studies have been done on the matter of risk in the petroleum industry in the latter years. 
Most of these studies focus on financial risk, return and corporate performance in a financial- 
and economic perspective. There seems however, to be a lack of studies focusing on enterprise 
risk management (ERM) and strategic risk management (SRM) in petroleum companies. To 
pursue filling this gap in the research literature, this thesis seeks to investigate such. More 
concretely, how the companies identify and manage critical risks. The follow problem 
statements are therefore addressed: 
 
How does companies approach enterprise risk management and how are risks identified? 
What strategic risks are perceived to be critical and how are they managed? 
 
The Barents Sea is an international petroleum’s province, where not only Norwegian companies 
operates but also international companies. Norwegian offshore is very attractive for the 
petroleum industry worldwide, and the Norwegian economy depend on this industry. The 
Norwegian Barents Sea, among other Arctic areas, is in a high degree debated by many different 
stakeholders such as ordinary people, organizations, and political parties. The environment is 
perceived as very fragile, and industry in this area receives much skepticism and critique. As 
the Norwegian authorities has decided on opening even more blocks in the Norwegian Barents 
Sea an increase in business activity is a natural deduction. Increase in business activity may 
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increase petroleum related risks and uncertainty for accidents to happen. This thesis is therefore 
set to study two petroleum companies in the Norwegian Barents Sea. Because some of the 
companies operating in the given area has its origin worldwide, this study is comparative in the 
manner of one case study including both a national and an international company present in the 
Norwegian Barents Sea. In-depth interviews have been performed with respondents from both 
companies. To create a better understanding and balance of the regulatory environmental data 
provided by the Norwegian authorities, an interview with an expert in such has been included.  
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The second chapter in this thesis presents a theoretical framework by describing the theories 
regarding enterprise risk management and strategic risk management and relevant concepts. As 
the study investigates both a national and international view on risk identification and 
management in the Arctic some risks associated with this internationalization such as country 
risk, regulatory risk and political risk is presented in this chapter as well.  Explanation and 
presentation of my philosophical approach regarding my research, and the methods used for 
collecting and analyzing data is further explained in chapter three. To explain the context of 
petroleum activities in the Arctic chapter four presents a context background for the study. 
Chapter five presents findings from my interviews. Chapter six makes discussions of findings 
in the framework of theory and data, and finally chapter seven will build a conclusion of the 
research question. Further study’s limitations, contribution, and suggestions to further research 
will be elaborated also.  
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Chapter 2. Theoretical framework  
This chapter presents a theoretical framework by describing basic assumptions of enterprise 
risk management (ERM) and strategic risk management (SRM) and the main concepts of these 
theories. Initially, the concept of risk and management of risks will be presented. Followed by 
a description of ERM and SRM and its main concepts. The chapter is summarized with a 
theoretical framework model that the empirical analysis will been founded on.  
 
“A smart man learns from his own mistakes and a wise man from the mistakes of others, but a 
fool never learns” (Lam, 2003, p. 15) 
 
2.1. Risk management 
Risk can be measured by how much there is to lose or gain (Buckley, et al., 2016) and risk deals 
with an event (or occurrence) and the consequence of this that might occur (Aven, et al., 2008). 
“Risk is part of every human endeavor” (Damodaran, 2008, p. 3).  Since one cannot know if the 
event will occur or not, uncertainty is linked to both event and consequence exists (Ibid.). 
Uncertainty in itself is for many diffuse. Once can say that uncertainty occurs when the outcome 
of a situation is not fully understood (Kardes, et al., 2013). Thus uncertainty provides to a more 
unpredictable character on corporate performance (Miller, 1992). Whether the event and/or the 
consequence will occur can be expressed through probability (Aven, et al., 2008). Risk, in such, 
is a consequence or result of an innate uncertainty connected with the actions carried out 
(Chapman & Cooper, referred in Verbano & Venturini, 2013). Uncertainties and risk is 
important as impact of the perceived uncertainty affects how an organization pushes for control, 
and how uncertainties are perceived and conceptualized into risk (Arena, et al., 2010). In this 
hotchpotch of terms and definitions Aven (2012) highlights that risk as a term often is given 
the same definition as uncertainty. The “lack of ability to accurately predict the outcome of a 
performance measure” (Aven, 2012, p. 29). 
 
Risk comes in many different forms and terms; stake and uncertainty (Clarke & Varma, 1999), 
risk frequency and risk severity (Moody, 2001), and probability and impact (Walker, et al., 
2002). Common for these terms is that risk is scaled into a potential gain and/or loss. As stakes 
increase the potential gain/loss increase (Clarke & Varma, 1999). To better understand the 
impact of risks, many companies rank risk. This can lead to the development of risk maps with 
a detailed action plan within the company (Walker, et al., 2002). Analyzing, evaluating, and 
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prioritizing the different risks in the organizations environment is all a part of the strategic 
business process. This way of gathering information regarding stakes and uncertainty might 
provide management to become aware of risks the organization faces (Clarke & Varma, 1999). 
This way of processing risk also provides management to decide on their risk tolerance levels. 
Because of potential huge impact on reputation, companies such as Shell and BP has close to 
zero tolerance for environmental risk (Ibid.). It is challenging for an organization to prevent and 
protect itself from dangers and threats if it is not capable of identifying these (Aven, et al., 
2008); “you cannot manage what you haven’t identified” (Aven, et al., 2008, p. 55). Identifying 
possible threats and dangers is something of the most important task an organization can do, 
but it is easy that this exercise gets unvaried. In many cases risk analyses are copied from a 
previous analysis. By doing so new risks might be overlooked. It is important that identification 
of the initiating events is conducted through in a structured and systematic way by people with 
necessary competencies (Ibid.).  
 
Risk management is used when risks are identified (Aven & Renn, 2012). Reducing or altering 
consequences by appropriate actions risk management becomes a tool for risk handling, and is 
put in the hands of the decision-maker (Ibid.). To understand risk in the company a risk analysis 
can be conducted, where the goal is to describe risk and map out the different risks. Initiating 
events as danger, threat, and opportunity, should be identified (Aven, et al., 2008). By 
identifying risk the cause and consequence picture becomes clearer. A risk analysis can identify 
relations and circumstances that has great impact in relation to risk. Making changes “on paper” 
is easier in the beginning of for example a project than later making changes in existing 
operating systems. Aven et al. (2008) further highlights that for a company to have a successful 
implementation of risk management, the risk management must be rooted in an organizations 
management. Risk management contains making decisions with high risk and uncertainties 
(Ibid.). 
 
Any business decision involves risk. Whether it is by making an investment, hiring and training 
new people, aligning performance measures with business objectives and balancing risk 
management and revenue growth in the business culture, risk is involved (Lam, 2003). The 
decision-making regarding risk is usually biased (Buckley, et al., 2016). Decision making is a 
process which should be continuously developed in the organizations strategy (Verbano & 
Venturini, 2013). The planning and understanding of an organization’s objectives and monitor 
resources which all influence outcomes is a part of risk management (Ibid.). Identification of 
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risk and knowing how to tackle this information is what organizations want to gain from risk 
management systems as it enables the organization to respond to risks (Christiansen & Thrane, 
2014). Having an effective risk management can reduce volatility in earning and it can 
maximize shareholder value and promote financial security. Knowing the nature of risk should 
be central for a risk manager when assessing risk (Lam, 2003). Transmission of information 
can be done through risk reporting and can enable the organization to identify and quantify risk. 
By evaluating risk through scenarios and likelihood for some to occur, its consequences and 
tangible as well as intangible costs, the organization determines how to manage risk (Nagumo, 
2005). Risk control and deciding whether to act upon (potential) risks can be done in many 
different ways but in the end, risk management is to ensure a risk level in an acceptable range 
(Lam, 2003). After identifying consequences through risk assessment, risk management can be 
used as a tool to prevent, reduce, or alter these results (Aven & Renn, 2012). Power (2004: 11) 
writes: “Risk management is much more than a technical analytical practice; it also embodies 
significant values and ideals, not least of accountability and responsibility”. Critical to success 
is according to Lam (2003) the involvement of the chief executive officer (CEO) and senior 
management, where the CEO have to make risk management a top priority and senior 
management is obliged to ask the right questions. Bhimani (2009) highlights a growing 
expectation for corporate boards overseeing the quality of internal management and strategic 
decisions relevant for the organization. Communication both vertically and horizontally in the 
organization will aid risk management as a responsibility to the people in the organization 
(Nagumo, 2005).  
 
2.2. Enterprise risk management 
Enterprise risk management (ERM) has gained attention the last decades in literature, industry, 
professions, and media (Soin & Collier, 2013). Enterprise risk management as a term appeared 
in academic paper in 2001 by Dickinson who defined it as “a systematic and integrated 
approach of the management of the total risks a company faces” (Dickinson, referred in 
Bromiley et al, 2015, p. 267). The key idea that binds strategy and risk management together 
(Nagumo, 2005) is the ERM system definition by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO) who defines ERM as “(…) a process, effected by an 
entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and 
across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and 
manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the 
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achievement of the entity’s objectives” (COSO, 2004). Kardes et al. (2013) identifies ERM as 
a new risk paradigm which has a company-wide approach of managing the organizations risk 
portfolio, and Walker et al. (2002) sees the implementation of ERM as a road to be traveled and 
not solely a destination to reach. ERM is attempted to be explained as a holistic approach for 
how it determines and evaluates risk (Arena, et al., 2010) and “is being advocated as a strategic 
management control system” (Mikes, 2009, p. 20). 
 
Risk management is all the activities and measures made to control risk. Balancing the conflict 
between exploring opportunities on one side, and avoid loss, accidents, and catastrophes on the 
other side, is what risk management is about (Aven, 2007). Risk management include risks that 
aren’t immediately quantifiable such as failing strategic objectives, environmental, reputational 
and operational risks (Mikes, 2009). Risk can appear in every part of an organization 
(Christiansen & Thrane, 2014). The Enterprise Risk Model (ERM) model from COSO suggests 
indicating that risk management is everyone’s responsibility in different degrees in an 
organization (Nagumo, 2005).  
 
Managing, assessing and identifying risk by a company-wide approach contrasts with the 
traditional silo approach (Kleffner, et al., 2003, p. 54). Risk assessment, evaluation, treatment 
and reporting are all elements in effective risk management and to achieve good risk 
management the organization needs to identify and handle risks in accordance with its appetite 
(Collier, et al., 2006). By viewing risk as a portfolio instead of a narrow perspective the 
organization view its risks in a total risk level instead of at an individual level (Kleffner, et al., 
2003). “The enterprise risk management approach is intended to align risk management with 
business strategy and embed a risk management culture into business operations” (Collier, et 
al., 2006, p. 2). By identifying and assessing the organizations own risk, risk that is over- and/or 
undermanaged can be identified and may have significant implications for resource allocation 
within the organization (Walker, et al., 2002). 
 
Walker et al. (2002) found in their studies that companies implementing ERM made an effort 
identifying the individual business risks. The risk identification process usually included 
gathering groups across the organization and getting together in workshops (Ibid.). Group 
representatives in assessing and managing risk can include risk managers, internal audit, safety 
and strategic planning are some of the roles that should be present in developing an ERM 
program (Moody, 2001). In the study of Walker et al. (2002) the groups spent time discussing 
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objectives and identified risks, developing top risk priorities and plans to manage them. One of 
the studied companies also, in addition to identify risk, spent time to find its root cause. To fully 
understand risk the right people needs to be involved (Ibid.). Another company included in the 
Walker et al.’s (2002) study included key executive and other qualified people with a better 
understanding of the risks. Risks identified also needs to be updated as risk are not necessarily 
static or stable. The studied companies did not assume risks to be stable, and therefore risks 
identified also needs to be understood on a frequent basis (Ibid.). 
 
ERM is directly related to strategy and it is the board of directors and senior executives who 
drives ERM and sets the direction of the organization. Hence the response to create an effective 
risk management practice is this top-down, holistic-approach. ERM is used as a tool to manage 
risk and in that manner the organizations likelihood to achieve its objectives within the 
stakeholders’ risk appetite (Beasley & Frigo, 2007). The various risk events that may occur is 
implemented in ERM and it tries to strategically balance these with the risk portfolio of the 
organization and the risk appetite of the stakeholders (Ibid.).  
 
Finding a balance between the organizations performance goals and targets, and the related 
risks is one of the tasks of the management. Maximizing value by setting strategic goals based 
on this balance is something ERM may influence. Management can consider different strategic 
alternatives when deciding on the potential returns are in accordance with the associated risks, 
and if these are within the risk appetite of the stakeholder (Beasley & Frigo, 2007). In many 
cases strategic planning is set at a given time aspect as for example a five-year period where 
certain measures are made to monitor the implementation of the strategic plan (Paladino, et al., 
2009). ERM is unlike the strategic plan as it is an ongoing process and open-ended, and in some 
organizations strategy planning has become more of a continuous process where the plans are 
reviewed more often than every three years (Ibid.). Strategic planning and performance 
assessment is an integral part of ERM as managers evaluate different strategic alternatives and 
its impact on the organizations total risk profile (Beasley, et al., 2006).  
“Uncertainty requires that strategy is concerned less with specific actions and the more 
with establishing clarity of direction within which short-term flexibility can be 
reconciled with overall coordination of strategic decisions” (Grant, 2003, p. 493) 
 
Management control systems can be defined as routines and procedures that are formalized 
which use information to sustain or change patterns in organizational activity (Simons, 1987). 
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Simons (1991) separate management control systems in two: diagnostic control systems and 
interactively control systems (Simons, 1991; Mikes, 2009). Diagnostic systems appear when 
management approve strategies and is communicated downwards in the organization. If not 
everything goes according to plan (exception) formal systems are used to inform top 
management. Interactive control systems appear when managers use control systems in an 
active manner involving themselves personally and regularly in daily decision-making (Simons, 
1991). Simons (1987; 1991, p. 50) present four typical conditions that are used interactively: 
the highest levels of management address the agenda of information from management control 
systems, the interactive process requires frequent attention from operating managers at all 
organizational levels, information from meeting are discussed and interpreted by superiors, 
subordinates and peers, and underlying data, its assumptions and actions, relies on being 
continually challenged. Interactive control systems were used by top managers to focus the 
attention of the organization on strategic uncertainties that could derail the future vision 
(Simons, 1991). Simons (1991, p. 60) found in his study that there are “fundamental differences 
in the way that policy-making managers use control systems” where the information from 
management control systems associated with strategic uncertainties regarding the organizations 
future was in the managers focus (Ibid.). “(…) Top management vision is the essential 
ingredient for interactive management control systems” (Simons, 1991, p. 61).  
 
Mikes (2009) argues that the manageability of risks and the formulation of risk management is 
developed on the basis of the personal background (both institutional and professional) in 
relation with ERM practices. Mikes (2009) further emphasize that in addition to internal 
influence, the external institutional pressure must be taken into account in respect to ERM 
practices. In her analysis of ERM practices two corporate governance concerns are highlighted: 
the shareholder value drive (control system measured in relation to shareholder value) and the 
risk-based internal control imperative (broader focus on strategic objectives including non-
financial aspects) (Mikes, 2009, p. 22). Mikes (2009) studied four different ideal models of risk 
management: risk silo management, integrated risk management, risk-based management and 
holistic risk management where the latter is of interest for this assignment. Holistic risk 
management focus on the risk-based internal control. COSO, as mentioned earlier, advocate 
ERM as a framework to capture risk relevant for an organizations strategic objectives and as 
Walker et al. (2002, p. 28) highlights; “ERM implementation is more a road to be traveled than 
a destination to reach” 
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Power (2004) highlights that the focus on, and talk about, risk itself has grown the last years 
and the balance between primary and secondary risk management seems to have shifted to the 
latter. Qualitative changes as risk aligned with good governance agendas has expanded the 
qualitative risk management (Power, 2004) 
 
An emerging consensus including three aspects seems to have risen according to Bromiley et 
al. (2015): ERM is more efficient viewing risks of a portfolio instead of individual subsidiaries, 
ERM incorporates risks such as traditional and strategic risks, and ERM viewing risk not only 
as a problem but something to gain competitive advantage. By doing so enterprises can consider 
operational risks which arises “from the actions of people, systems and processes (…)” (Soin 
& Collier, 2013, p. 83). ERM has evolved since it was first defined but the most important 
change is its emphasis on aligning strategy and risk management (Nagumo, 2005). Risk may 
be classified in different frameworks and this thesis follows Walker et al.’s (2002) 
classification, namely: Strategic Risk, Operational Risk, Financial Risk and Hazard Risk. 
Operational risk is related to the processes and systems within an organization and its people 
and technology. Financial risk includes currency volatility, interest rates and commodities, and 
hazard risk is insurable risks such as natural disasters and terrorism. This thesis focuses on 
strategic risk which is according to Moody (2001, p. 123) “by far the most difficult to address”. 
Strategic risk can relate to the entity’s decision-making process and the ability to pursue 
strategic business goals and objectives (Moody, 2001). It can include an company’s strategy, 
political, economic, regulatory, global market conditions, and reputation risk (Walker, et al., 
2002). Historically strategic risk has been addressed separately and as a result risk management 
practices has had little formal development (Moody, 2001). Clarke & Varma (1999, p. 414) 
argues that “an integrated strategic risk management approach allows companies to 
consistently deliver superior performance while proactively managing risks”.  
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Figure 1:  The concept of risk 
 
2.2. Strategic risk management 
As explained earlier in this thesis enterprise risk management enables the company to identify 
and assess risk in a holistic manner. There are many risk factors possible to affect a company 
I want to gain a broader knowledge about how petroleum companies operating in Arctic areas 
identify strategic risks and manage these. As Buckley et al. (2016, p. 133) puts it: “Risk-taking 
is, after all, a matter of strategic choice, and it is the managers who make the choice.”  
 
2.2.1. Strategic risk 
Strategy is “the long-term goal of an organization” (Johnson, et al., 2011, p. 3) and “a pattern 
in a stream of decisions” (Mintzberg, 2007, p. 3). Having knowledge about the company’s 
resources and capabilities is important, but also managing information about the external 
environment (Herring, 1992). The external environment, that consists of amongst other 
political, economic and environmental factors, are “likely to have a high impact on the success 
or failure of strategy” (Johnson et al, 2011, p. 50). The high-level goals of an organization- the 
strategic objectives- are the core in the strategy of an organization (Frigo & Anderson, 2011).  
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Strategic risk is risks that originate from an organizations strategic objectives or its business 
strategy (Deloitte, 2013). Failing to achieve the organizations business objectives, which is 
often a result of managers decision making, is strategic risk (Weller, 2008). Kallman (2007) 
writes that it is not the managers decision-making alone that influence strategic risk levels in 
an organization, but also how it is positioned to its environment. Managing strategic risk is a 
dynamic process where organizations identify and assess different obstacles that influence 
and/or prevent the financial and operational goals of the organization (Chatterjee et al., 2003 
referred in Verbano & Venturini, 2013). 
 
As strategic risk highlighted the long-term aspect, strategic risk management (SRM) is 
important in terms of monitoring and having a response for such risks (Mohammed & Sykes, 
u.d.). SRM should enable the company to be aware of which risks can make the company 
perform so poorly that it could “potentially result in significant losses, destruction of 
shareholder value, or a damaged corporate reputation.” (Frigo referred in Paladino, et al., 
2009, p. 44). Deloitte (2013) found in a survey that 81% of the companies surveyed has 
expanded their focus from traditional risk areas (operational, financial and compliance) to 
including strategic risk management as well including any major risk that could strike the 
organization. With business trends and technological innovations such as social media and big 
data, organizations experience strategic risks striking faster than before (Ibid.). 
 
Having experience can provide an experience-based advantage (Damodaran, 2008). 
Responding to future harm and managing ambiguous threats is influenced by amongst other 
three factors; human cognition, group dynamics and organizational culture (Roberto, et al., 
2006). Cognitive biases, our “stubborn attachment to existing beliefs” (Wohlstetter, referred in 
Roberto et al., 2006), is an obstacle to face ambiguous threats. People are more prone to 
emphasize information confirming the existing beliefs and views, and the commitment to 
already existing actions is likely to be followed- especially when there has been invested time 
and money in them (Ibid.). How (decision-making) groups are formed also plays a significant 
role. A group of capable individuals does not necessarily form a solid team. Focus on the 
atmosphere and design, and creating an environment for constructive conflicts, can foster 
effective communication and underpin competitive threats (Ibid.). Managers forms the culture 
and mind-set in an organization, which according to Roberto et al. (2006) consist of two view: 
an operational mind-set that is more set by routines and procedures, or an experimental mind-
set which has a ‘learning by doing’ approach. Providing ‘recovery windows’ of learning and 
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improving where assessing early warning signs of ambiguous threats can prevent catastrophic 
failures. By practice responses, amplifying signals, and formal experiments as well through a 
more informal approach, facing ambiguous threats can be fostered (Ibid.). Strategic risk 
management can prevent unprepared events from occurring by identifying potential ‘inflection 
points’ (Calandro, 2015). Mitigating ambiguous threats through identification of potential 
enterprise threats as well as assessing and economically managing these is a central part of 
SRM (Ibid).  
 
Frigo & Litman (2001) describes the thought and activity of management as two processes; one 
regarding business strategy, and the other business execution. The authors highlights the 
management’s ability (or inability) to combine business strategy and execution in the 
organization that will influence the result of strategic risk management.  
“Central elements of the strategic management process comprise risk management 
considerations in conjunction with planning discussions, environmental analyses, 
contingency plans, strategic controls, etc. The availability to respond to changing 
conditions is also influenced by the organization’s decision structure and absorption of 
market intelligence, internal information exchange, and eventually the use of these 
insights to construe and execute suitable responsive actions” (Andersen, 2006, p. 9).  
  
2.2.2. Reputational risk 
As pointed out in the previous subchapter the technological innovations result in information 
spread in a high speed through social media all around the world. As the influence of such, 
where communication has an instantaneous power of influence, companies should have a sound 
response to such (Mohammed & Sykes, u.d.). Reputational risk is now, as Deloitte (2013, p. 4) 
write “the biggest risk concern” as it is harder for organizations to control and if not managed 
in a proper manner reputation risk can escalate to a major strategic crisis (Ibid.). Therefore, 
reputational risk is included as a strategic risk.  
 
The energy sector has reputational risk as number one risk- which is a change in trend as it 
wasn’t in the top five three years ago (Ibid.). Cole (2012) found that an organizations market 
value is more than 25 percent directly attributed to its reputation. For example, in a study by 
Deloitte (2013) is the increasing focus on reputational risk resided at the highest level in an 
organization (Cole, 2012). In Deloitte’s study the most important stakeholders for an 
organization regarding managing reputational risk were found to be customers. This because 
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critical to an organizations success is the customer’s expectations and perception influence if 
value is created or destroyed. If the organization doesn’t fulfill the expectations of the customer 
reputation is damaged. Other stakeholders of significant value were regulators, senior 
executives, employees, and investors. In the same study Deloitte (2013) found that 87 percent 
of the executives’ rate reputational risk as more important than any other strategic risk, and 88 
percent “are explicitly focusing on managing reputation risk” (Deloitte, 2013, p. 4). In the 
energy and resource sector 48 percent of the reputation risk driver is regarding ethics and 
integrity, 48 percent regarding product and services and 40 percent is regarding physical and/or 
cyber security (Deloitte, 2013). Power (2004) sets off risk communication as one of two areas 
where risk manager is apparent. Risk acceptance decisions are argued to be not only left to 
scientific experts but is also a matter of public interest. This leads to some involvement with 
the public and stakeholders since perceptions of risk may be varied. Management of strategies 
which influence perception gaps between the public expectations and performance of 
organizations can be done by risk communication. The second area is risk-based regulation 
where regulatory systems establish broad frameworks regarding organizational control 
practices. This to enable resources where they are most relevant for risk. Legal systems, media 
and social processes influence the outcome of reputational risk and is normally not controllable 
for an organization (Power, 2004). 
 
2.2.3. Climate risk  
It is important for this study to pull climate risk forward even though it is not highlighted by 
Walker et al. (2002) as a strategic risk. Environment, or climate, in respect to risk is usually 
seen as hazard risk related to natural disasters (Walker et al., 2002). As strategic risk 
management is to have a response to future risks occurring, climate is relevant. Seen in the 
introduction to this chapter, environment is related to the external environment and is 
exemplified as pollution and waste (Johnson, et al., 2011). In the same turn companies need to 
be able to identify such risks and be prepared with a response. Climate is not left alone as a 
risk only related to physical environment. Climate risk can be linked to national goals such as 
reducing pollution (Johnson, et al., 2011) or the public outrage in forms of major campaigns 
by NGOs (Roberts & Frantisak, 2015).  
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2.2.4. Economical risk 
Typically referred to as characteristics in an economy “that increase vulnerabilities to an 
external shock, or structural fundamentals and policy that can be the basis of home-grown 
payment crises” (Toksöz, 2014, p. 55). Exchange-rate risks and macroeconomic volatility are 
also components that are part of economic risk (Ibid.). Petroleum prices might be viewed as a 
speculative risk. The same goes for the potential of a petroleum reservoir. Speculative risk refers 
to outcome from situations where performance measures can be both favorable or unfavorable 
(Aven, 2012). Speculative and pure risk was often made as a distinction in earlier literature. 
When the outcome from a situation is solely unfavorable the risk is referred to as pure risk 
(Ibid.). “Another economic policy risk that can arise is the lack of fit between domestic policies 
and those of major trade partners. This is not a rogue policy like the ones above, but the failure 
of government policy to adjust to changing global conditions either through lack of 
understanding or because of political and institutional constraints.” (Toksöz, 2014, p. 153).  
 
2.2.5. Regulatory risk  
Reguatory risk is composition, usually evolved over time, of many regulatory frameworks 
(Toksöz, 2014). Changes in the regulatory framework, especially the unexpected ones, is 
becoming a micro-level risk and it needs monitoring. These are amongst other very present in 
industries highly regulated (Ibid.). “Taxation and regulatory fines have become common 
features of risk-facing multinational business.” (Toksöz, 2014, p. 195) 
 
2.2.6. Political risk 
Political risk reflects the risk that may affect investment returns because of instability in a given 
country (host country) or due to political changes (Investopedia, u.å.a). Buckley et al. (2016) 
highlights the political institution literature that suggests that multinational enterprises have 
power to influence policy changes that are in favor of the enterprise. Investopedia (u.å) points 
out two types of political risk; the macro risk which implies governmental actions that affects 
all firms entering the host country, and micro risk which influence a certain sector or business. 
Meyer et al. (2009) points out that the institutions influence the strategy of the organization 
entering the host country as these again influence the market mechanism. Regulatory regimes, 
formal rules, information systems and property rights are some of the aspects institutions 
include and so will influence the risk of entering these markets. Gaining information about 
business partners and likely behavior may lead to more effective market mechanisms and 
reduce market failure (Meyer, et al., 2009).  In countries with mature political institutions and 
17 
a developed economy, political risk is not especially emphasized with political risk (Toksöz, 
2014). The effect of low political risk enables flexibility and effectiveness in political-, policy- 
and marketinstitutions to respond to both domestic and global pressure (Ibid.). 
“Nationalization, expropriation and licence cancellation are ultimate political risks where 
physical assets are involved in cross-border transactions” (Toksöz, 2017, p. 202).  
 
The petroleum industry has some distinguishes that can relate to some of the strategic risks. As 
governments and state actors have authority over extraction and development of oil reserved, 
economic and political factors influence the investment decision of petroleum companies 
(Allsopp & Fattouh, 2013). As the duration of petroleum projects usually has long duration 
delays might occur. These delays may be caused by negotiation between international and 
national petroleum companies and the owner (in Norway’s case the government), access to the 
reserves, the size of the project, and large capital expenses. The investors investment decision 
can also affect the market structure and in turn influence the development of the oil price (Ibid.).  
 
Activities of national oil companies influence the macro-economic picture. With growing 
economic, social, and political importance, both domestically and internationally, the 
performance of the companies will have implications for the global energy industry 
(McPherson, 2013). The performance of national oil companies contributes to sustainable 
development and stability. By commitment to support institutional capacity, transparency, and 
accountability, systemic risks might be avoided (Ibid.). Competition, used by Konoplyanik 
(2013), refers to a number of participants in the market. The energy market has evolved going 
from one dominant fuel to a more competitive energy mix. Coexistence with multiple 
contractual structures and pricing mechanisms are also influencing the new landscape in the 
development of the energy market (Konoplyanik, 2013). Konoplyanik (2013) points out that 
the changes in the market is in addition to already existing structures- which leads to a new 
dynamic balance (Konoplyanik, 2013). 
 
2.2.7. Risk from internationalizing  
Since this is a comparative study of one domestic company and an international company, 
highlighting factors that can affect the international company is relevant for this thesis. In such 
manner the two next subchapters will point out some factors that an international company must 
consider when establishing operations in the host country- which in this case is Norway. These 
risks are articulated to the regulatory and political risk from a foreign perspective.  
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In general, one can say that internationalization is an (ongoing) process where an organization 
increase their international involvement. A part of the internationalization process is the 
organizations commitment and experience in the foreign market, and how it uses this in 
integrating in the market and gradual acquisition (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Ahmed et al. 
(2002) highlights that when organizations decide to expand internationally it faces risk. 
International risk is defined as “the dangers firms faced in terms of limitations, restrictions or 
even losses when engaging in international business” (Ahmed, et al., 2002, p. 805). Attributes 
the target country consist of comes in geographic, economic, demographic, and institutional 
forms (Kraus, et al., 2015). By controlling operations of the international business unit 
management believes that this will reduce risk associated with international expansion (Cyert 
& March, referred in Ahmed, et al., 2002). Entry modes might change as a result of the need 
for control and influence the strategic decision by for example sharing responsibility through 
joint venture or licensee (Ahmed, et al., 2002). 
 
When conducting business in a foreign market costs are related to the entry decision. An entry 
barrier that occurs when internationalizing is the lack of knowledge and experience in that 
particular market. This says something about the foreignness. Many organizations make 
incremental decisions in this process as this enables it to extend its knowledge in the foreign 
market (Weaver, 2016). Not all organizations undergo an incremental internationalization 
process. Pedersen and Shaver (2010, referred in Weaver, 2016) found that this process can also 
be discontinuous depending on risks related to decisions. “Internationalization resources may 
include financial, technical, information or human resource capability based” (Weaver, 2016: 
9). Weaver (2016: 9) points out that doing business in a specific geographical area the 
organizations have to “tap into foreign embassy and national development aid institutions to 
consult and inform them”. 
 
Johanson & Vahlne (1977) highlights institutional knowledge can include characteristics in the 
host country, business climate and cultural patterns (Hilmersson, 1997). Institutional 
isomorphism is where organizations compete for political power and institutional legitimacy as 
well as resources and customers, is useful for understanding modern organizational life 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Rodriguez et al. (2010) suggests a set of risk management tools 
for SMEs to create internationalization as a competitive advantage; classification of risks may 
identify risks that can influence the organizations projects, and enable organizations to control 
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and manage these risks. They also highlight coherence and homogeneity as a result of a general 
framework regarding internationalization. To predict and manage problems that can emerge in 
an internationalization process these risk management tools are necessary. Using a common 
perspective can provide policies and practices that gives homogeneity to the internationalization 
process (Ibid.). 
 
2.2.7.1. Country risk  
Country risk can in such be generalized to “the losses that could arise as a result of the 
interruption of repayments or the operations of entities engaged in cross-border investments 
caused by country events as opposed to commercial, technical, or management problems 
specific to the transaction” (Toksöz, 2014, p. 48).  One of the components in the broad view of 
country risk is operational or jurisdiction risks. These refers to country-specific business 
environment risks. Country specific business environment risks includes for example regulatory 
risk, infrastructure availability, transparency and red tape, and governance risk. Partly 
overlapping in the section of jurisdiction risk is political risk. If there is events of political 
change in the host country or if the international environment changes in a geostrategic way, 
disruption of operations might be a consequence of this (Ibid.). Different actors other than 
government such as political minority groups may cause events that can be viewed as political 
risks. These risks can be difficult to predict as they can evolve slowly and/or suddenly. Risk 
management structures has been expanded the past decades to deal with different risks such as 
credit, market, operations and liquidity risks. Recently country risk became a part of this 
expansion (Ibid.). As Toköz (2012, p. 59) highlights regarding country risk only referring to 
cross border risks: “investing in another jurisdiction requires the gathering of extra information 
and knowledge. There are risks in geographical, institutional and cultural distance, as well as 
in dealing with local politicians.” At the same time organizations face macroeconomic and 
political risks such as regulatory risks, taxation changes and monetary policy adjustments in 
their home countries (Ibid.).  
 
Three interrelated critical components for internationalization is knowledge about 
internationalization (company-specific knowledge), foreign business knowledge (market 
specific knowledge) and institutional knowledge (governmental and institutional framework in 
a particular foreign market) are three interrelated critical components in the process of 
internationalization (Rodriguez, et al., 2010). Not having sustainable tools to manage 
knowledge acquired in the process of internationalization may lead to not being able to predict 
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risks and therefore not creating a competitive advantage (Ibid.). Rodriguez et al. (2010) propose 
a model which include parts such as policies and guidelines which create a culture for 
continuous learning, a system on how the organizations evolve in the process of 
internationalization, and mechanisms devoted to monitor the industrial environment the 
organization operates in (Ibid.). 
 
Miller & Waller’s (2003) developed an uncertainty framework where they found different 
environmental uncertainties that managers should consider. “Integrated risk management 
emphasises the full spectrum of a firm’s exposures to environmental contingencies” (Miller & 
Waller, 2003, p. 105). Relevant for this thesis is the general environmental uncertainties and 
the firm-specific uncertainties. The general environment uncertainties include government 
policies, economic conditions and social trends that can influence companies in specific 
locations. Within the firm specific uncertainties are firm operations, research and development, 
financing and behaviors of managers and employees. Forecasting the future and deciding what 
the key uncertainties are in the light of how the consequences of such uncertainty will have on 
business performance (Ibid.). Miller & Waller (2003) recommends starting at a business unit 
level and then expanding its analysis to a corporate level since understanding how the 
environmental uncertainties affect the organization as a whole has a higher priority 
 
 
Figure 2: Theoretical framework model of ERM and SRM 
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Chapter 3. Method 
This chapter will illuminate what kind of considerations I have made in this comparative case 
study. Views on ontology, epistemology and methodology will be presented, and further insight 
in choice of research design and judgements will be presented.  
 
3.1 The research philosophy 
There are different paradigms within the philosophy of science that have different assumptions 
about the nature of reality, also referred to as ontology (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013). To enquire 
into the world, the nature of our knowledge and assumptions of it, concerns the epistemology 
(Ibid.). The progress of scientific discoveries in practice are the description of a ‘paradigm’ 
(Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013), and “is what the members of a scientific community share (…)” 
(Kuhn, 1996). How the research is conducted through methods and techniques depends on 
assumptions made by the researcher through choice of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013).  
 
3.1.1. Ontology 
Ontology consist of different views on reality where ‘truth’ and ‘facts’ will vary accordingly to 
the philosophy. Within social science the positions of internal realism, relativism and 
nominalism varies as it depends on what kind of topic is being enquired and the researcher’s 
preferences (Ibid.). An internal realist sees a single reality, but the researcher cannot access 
facts directly. Relativism sees many truths, and facts are created by the people where the ‘truth’ 
is reached through discussions with the main advocator. As different observers may have 
different point of views many perspectives of a reality can be discovered. Nominalism positions 
to no single truth, but has its focus on how different versions of ‘truth’ is being established by 
people, and therefore that facts are made by humans (Ibid.). As I am deep diving into a subject 
related to human decision making and considerations are central, I would like to initiate and 
increase a general understanding of the phenomenon I am studying. Therefore, the relativist 
ontology approach, where truths are multiple and the viewpoint of the observer influence how 
facts are accessed and addressed, the relativist way of inquiring into the world is used (Easterby-
Smith, et al., 2013). This as I seek the practitioners view in order to build local knowledge.  
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3.1.2 Epistemology  
The epistemological debate in social science has been a contrasting view between positivism 
and social constructionism, where at one stance the positivist view on the social world is that it 
exists externally. On the other side, the social constructionism, believes that the world is 
subjective and given its meaning by the people (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013). To enquire into 
the nature of the social world I as a researcher influence my thesis by my epistemological 
position. As strategic risk management is a broad subject and entails no final solution, my 
purpose with this study is not to uncover one single truth. Rather to increase a general 
understanding of risk assessments in a dynamic world based on different perceptions and 
considerations. Therefore, I position my research through a social constructionism approach 
where reality is determined by the people working in the petroleum industry, and their 
experiences create constructs and meanings to my research. My approach may be viewed as a 
normal constructionism where knowledge is subjectively constructed but in consideration and 
acceptance of objective and independent knowledge (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013).  
 
This study had a deductive reasoning approach. For me to gain knowledge about my research 
it was necessary for me to create synthesis as my first step. I had some preconceptions about 
the phenomenon, and started with a minimum of information beforehand. Starting of with 
following the Straussian view where new local theory arises from an interaction between theory 
and data interaction (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013) I as a researcher got familiar with previous 
research conducted in the field of interest and this being a master thesis, usage of previous 
academic theory has been necessary.  
 
3.1.3. Methodology  
A paradigm also denotes the appropriate methodologies to pursue knowledge (methodology; 
i.e. research design and methods). The ontological and epistemological philosophy has 
implications for my methodological approach. In the next subchapters the choice of design, 
collecting data and analyzing it and in general how this study is conducted to provide 
knowledge on the phenomenon is explained.  
 
3.2. Research design  
Deciding on a qualitative or quantitative method both to collect and analyze data is dependent 
on the philosophy that underpins my research. Quantitative approach is most often used by 
positivistic researcher and is suitable when the intention of the research is to investigate the 
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impact, frequency or extent of a phenomenon (Jacobsen, 2015). A qualitative approach is most 
often used by relativistic researchers as it let one explore different shades of data collected, and 
is sensitive to unexpected circumstances (Ibid.). This research is qualitative and as explained in 
the previous paragraphs concerning method, my basis for this study is that there is no absolute 
truth in social life (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013). Different methods approaching and acquiring 
‘truths’ in the constructionistic design exists. Gaining a holistic perspective at and within the 
company and its behavior is one of the benefits by using this approach. Case method, is where 
the study goes in-depth in one or a small number of organizations looking to answer present 
circumstances (Yin, 2014) generally over time. It aims (in the constructionist epistemology) to 
provide a rich picture of the organizational behavior and life (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013). As 
I am conducting a case study within two petroleum companies with different countries of origin, 
it enables me to do a comparative analysis. This means I as a researcher are looking for “the 
same event or process in different settings or situations” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013, p. 58). 
Since I am taking a constructionist point of view my research is not as concerned with issues 
of external validity, but rather to provide a rich picture of how my respondents assess strategic 
risk in the Norwegian offshore industry. Studies which are constructionist in their epistemology 
are usually conducted through interviews where it is based on direct personal contact and 
observations (Ibid.).  
 
Being explicit on the unit of analysis is important as this will be the data collection. Since my 
approach is based on a constructionist view clarity on unit of analysis is not essential, but can 
provide guidance for analysis (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013). In my research people with central 
positions regarding decision-making when it comes to risk and strategy in petroleum companies 
is my unit of analysis. Robert Yin, a well-known case study researcher, highlights that case 
study is appropriate in studies when questions like “how” and “why” are the main focus, the 
researcher do not know how different events will turn out, and when contemporary (the “case”) 
phenomenon are the focus of the study (Yin, 2014). Yin (2014) also discusses the epistemology 
behind a case study- the philosophy of research- where the two distinct approaches are a realist 
view which assumes that the reality is independent of the observer, and the relativist view, 
which I mentioned in the previous paragraph, where the reality can be multiple and have 
multiple meanings depending on the observer.  
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3.3. Collecting data 
All the data I collect is qualitative. As strategic risk management is conducted through an 
organizations strategic objectives and decision making, my assumption is amongst other that 
acquiring information through narrative methods would provide valuable point of views. Yin 
(2014) mentions six sources of evidence where interviews are one source. Interviews gives me 
as a researcher the ability to focus directly on the topics of my case study, and can provide me 
insight in form of explanations and personal views (Ibid.). Thus, there area some pitfalls in 
using interviews as a source which I have to be aware of. Biases may occur both in how I choose 
to formulate my questions but also in the responses I get. Since I am conducting shorter case 
study interviews the questions I ask must be carefully worded and specific. Conducting in-depth 
interviews gives me as I researcher the opportunity to collect information regarding strategic 
risk. The response I get from the respondents is probably seen from the worldview of the 
respondents and I as interviewer should assist the respondent in exploring their beliefs on the 
topics (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013). I have gotten familiar with previous research and as a 
researcher I already have some preconceptions about how the petroleum companies identify 
risk in Arctic areas. A semi-structured interview, which is more of a guided open interview, can 
provide answers which is more personal in nature and thus give a higher degree of 
confidentiality (Ibid.). Easterby-Smith et al. (2013) highlights semi-structured interviews as an 
appropriate method when it is necessary for me as interviewer to understand the construct the 
respondents use. I am not familiar with how strategic risk management is formed in petroleum 
companies nor the linguistics of this environment. This leads to the second point of Easterby-
Smith et al. (2013); semi-structured interviews may help me understand the respondent’s 
‘world’. How companies identify different risk aspects can be, but not necessarily, a subject 
that is highly confidential or commercially sensitive, and lastly thereby a semi-structured 
interview might be a powerful tool in gaining a more personal sphere (Ibid.). Based on theories 
and by concepts developed in previous research and the normative literature, I made an 
interview guide where the key topics in the literature were addressed (see Appendix 1).  
 
3.3.1 Participants of the Study  
In selecting respondents to my research, I decided the main criteria: they have to be present in 
the Norwegian offshore. As the context is the Norwegian offshore Arctic area, because this 
research is conducted in a short period of time (January-June), and because of current 
discussions and interests regarding the Norwegian Barents Sea, I limited the geographical area 
to the before mentioned Norwegian offshore Arctic sea. To choose my respondents I used the 
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Norwegian Petroleum Directorate’s offshore map which includes all companies that have 
license or are operators per June 20th 2016. Since my thesis researches an area with both 
presence of national actors as well as international the petroleum companies in my research are 
kept in accordance. Since the selection was also chosen on the basis of gaining a better 
understanding and knowledge of how the petroleum companies identifies risk it allowed me to 
look at it from a foreign perspective as well as domestic. In total two companies participated in 
the study; one domestic and one international. The choice of one domestic and one international 
company also provided me with the possibility to conduct a comparative analysis. A total of 
four respondents gave me their insight, reflections, and time; two employees from each of the 
companies. I have chosen to keep the respondents anonymous. From the domestic company the 
two respondents have central positions in handling Arctic challenges. In the international 
company the two respondents are managers each to their own area. And further, to give a 
broader view on certain risks in the Arctic area an expert from the Norwegian Petroleum Safety 
Authority (Ptil), that is an independent government regulator, provided me with an interview 
on challenges related to the regulatory system.   
 
3.4. Conducting the interviews  
All interviews have been conducted through Skype with a duration of 45 to 65 minutes. I used 
a sound recorder to be sure no information would be lost. The sound recorder provides me with 
all sound effects from the interview which I afterwards transcribed. Transcription is a specific 
transformation of oral conversation to written text (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015). To create an 
even higher degree of verification, what I transcribed from the interview I sent to the given 
respondents and provided them with the possibility to adjust the statements. All interviews were 
done in Norwegian, and were translated to English by me. The transcription is a set of important 
data collection. By having the interviews transcribed the data material is more suitable for 
analysis. When transcribing the interviews myself I get closely familiar with the material, I use 
the same written style (regarding punctuation, choice of word in cases such as “uhm”, “eh” and 
similar, pause and expressions of feelings) and I am at this point ready to start analyzing it 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015). After finishing the transcription, I listened to the whole interview 
continuous while reading the transcript. This to secure the reliability of the transcription (Ibid.).  
 
3.5. Analysis of data material 
I was well familiar with the content after transcribing it, and by reading the detailed transcripts 
I started envisaging what findings would be proper regarding the different features of strategic 
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risk management. Because of the subject my thesis concerns, identifying risk in an Arctic 
context, one may assume there is a clear pathway of how companies identify risk. I as a 
researcher am trying to comprehend and make sense of this phenomenon, and my reasoning is 
formed by the philosophy of science as described in chapter 3.1. “The research philosophy”.  
 
There are also some differences in analyzing and interpreting data, and I use a deductive 
approach in my way of analyzing it.  In analyzing the transcriptions I look for a pattern in the 
data material and when interpreting I view the material in a bigger context and I look for 
consequences my analysis and conclusion will have for my research (Johannessen, et al., 2011). 
First, I started by sorting and systematizing the data collected. As seen in chapter 5 the findings 
are a result of this process where I have reduced the original data material to the most important 
information relevant for my research. After this my analysis and interpretation of findings 
started. Here I identified themes and patterns relevant for risk identification in strategic risk 
management where interview guide’s main issues were my point of departure. Because of the 
preparations in beforehand I was able to use these in the analysis. It was organized in two ways: 
by cross section- and categorizing based data, and contextual data organizing (Ibid.). By looking 
for sentences or paragraphs where it is possible to identify particular themes relevant for 
strategic risk management and in its context the Arctic, cross-sectional classification of data 
was made. By looking for common features this also may be seen as category-based 
classification. The contextual approach let me as a researcher look at certain parts of the data 
material where I look for characteristics in a specific context while having a wholesome 
approach (Ibid.). Since I used a semi-structured interview guide I had different keywords 
relevant in addition to the main issues and these enabled me to approach the analysis in such 
way as before mentioned.  
 
3.6. Quality and credibility of the research 
By illuminating which epistemological and methodological research is grounded in the quality 
of my research the results aim for a higher justification than observations done merely from 
ordinary life (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013). Validity and reliability is usually associated with 
positivist methodology, and Easterby-Smith, et al. (2013) points out that ‘validity’ as a term 
seldom are used in constructionist designs which is my position in this research. In any case I 
see it expedient to highlight the quality of this research. As an alternative proposal more 
illuminating for this qualitative study I’ll be using the criteria of Guba & Lincoln (1985): 
credibility, transferability and dependability.   
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Credibility is the question regarding how believable my findings from this study are in terms 
of gathering of data, and how this data is cultivated. As this is a comparative case study 
conducted by me through in-depth interviews with respondents from the case companies the 
data gathering is in turn formed by the dialogue in the interviews rather than by structured 
techniques usually found in quantitative methods. By conducting thorough theoretical research 
previously of the case study an increased understanding for me as a researcher on the 
phenomenon became apparent. It was relevant for me to understand the world of the studied 
companies and the Barents Sea as an area for me to create credible findings. Through this 
chapter, a descriptive explanation has been provided to the reader, and in terms of this hopefully 
it will further increase the credibility of the research.  
 
Transferability is a question of whether the results from this study may be generalized or 
applicable in other settings. With this in mind I find it responsible by me to emphasize that the 
results from this study is more about building local knowledge that can inform general theory 
through a thick context description. The analysis is coded from the wholeness the study enters, 
and I as a researcher have constructed new knowledge in this specific area to illuminate the 
phenomenon.  
 
Dependability relates to “the extent to which measures and research findings provide accurate 
representation of the things they are supposed to describe” (Easterby-Smith, et al., 2013, p. 
347). Said in another way: am I measuring what I believe I am measuring? This is a qualitative 
study and I am not able to measure the data in the same manner I would have done in a 
quantitative study. If you conduct interviews over and over again you seldom get equal results. 
Therefore is it more challenging to use such in a qualitative design, but is something I as a 
researcher need to consider. I therefore prepared an interview guide where all questions were 
relevant for all respondents. In the same time is it important to highlight that the respondents 
have participated in the study voluntarily. Their motives for participating is not explicitly 
familiar to me, but as all are anonymous, the willingness to provide new knowledge to a relevant 
and highly actual problem at hand, can be one motive and to my knowledge whether their 
statements are true is considered from such motive.    
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3.6.1. Ethics 
It is important to consider the ethical aspects when conducting research. I as a researcher and 
my integrity is important for the quality of the scholarly information I provide. Decisions 
regarding ethical guidelines is decisive for this research (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2015). I claim 
that ethics will demonstrate itself within my discussions about reliability and validity of the 
study. 
 
3.6.2. Confidentiality 
The participants were given the option they could choose whether they would like to be 
anonymous or not. By choosing to be anonymous my responsibility as a researcher towards the 
respondents is that none of the information the respondents have provided me can be traced 
back to them. The information given through the interviews can only be used to the purpose of 
this thesis (Johannessen, et al., 2011). To ensure anonymity a fictive name has been used 
regarding the company name of the two case companies which in turn has resulted in the 
acronyms; DomOil and InterOil.  
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Chapter 4. Contextual risks: Arctic Petroleum  
In this chapter the Arctic as a petroleum province and the characteristic features in this province 
is presented to build contextual understanding behind the aim of this thesis. Even though the 
focus of this study is the Norwegian Barents Sea, defining the Arctic is relevant understanding 
that the Arctic is a complex environment in terms of physical factors and geographical 
discussions.  
 
4.1. Arctic 
The Arctic is a geographical area located at the northernmost part of the Earth (Arctic Council, 
2009). Emmerson & Glada, (2012) points out that the Arctic is not just one region, but it consists 
of varying areas with different conditions, geologically, environmentally and politically. Some 
areas, such as, the Barents Sea are considered to contain relatively more oil than gas. There 
exist different geographical definitions of the Arctic area. The territory above 60 degrees’ north 
latitude is often referred to as the “Arctic” by Arctic countries, and organizations often refers 
to Arctic projects based on typical characteristics of the area such as containing sea ice and/or 
ice bergs (Emmerson & Glada, 2012). The Arctic is also in some cases referred to as the territory 
and ocean sea north of the Arctic Circle which is 66 degrees north latitude (Ibid.). Some 
organizations such as the Arctic Council and the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
(PAME) has decided to not establish one single definition of the Arctic because they view the 
territory as something “(…) left for Arctic states to determine” (Arctic Council, 2009, p. 1). My 
thesis follows the definition of the Arctic from GeoPolitics which highlights that it is “the 
totality of the areas north of the polar circle” (Skagestad, u.d.). and is referred to as the “Arctic”, 
but the consensus in general literature is that there is not one Arctic but many (Emmerson & 
Glada, 2012). 
 
4.1.1. Arctic environment and manageability  
The Arctic area is a complex environment where petroleum industry must adapt to a challenging 
climate. Snow storms, sea ice, icebergs, freezing temperature, fog, remoteness, and darkness 
are all factors that impact the development of the industry in the Arctic (The Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2013). Following some distinct factors will be emphasized.  
 
4.1.1.1 Harsh weather 
The harsh weather influence transportation and logistics as it is hard to foresee and might cause 
delay of resupply. Extremely cold temperatures can harm both the equipment and people 
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working there (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). Polar low pressure might lead to rapid change 
in wind force and direction and could therefore influence activities in the Barents Sea negatively 
(BaSEC, 2015a). 
 
4.1.1.2 Wind and snow 
Wind measurements indicate that it will reduce the amount of snow on equipment. How 
icing/ice-bound will develop will depend on local conditions. Freezing rain and snow will 
increase the dangers of falling ice. Ice covering equipment may occur depending on wind 
strength, water- and air temperature (BaSEC, 2015a).   
 
4.1.1.3 Sea ice and icebergs  
Sea ice can limit transportation to Arctic areas and it can damage offshore structure and vessels 
(The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013). According to report by the BaSEC (2015a) the Arctic may 
be ice free during the summer months. In the south-east of the Barents Sea ice is not expected 
to be formed, but might occur drifting from north-east areas. Icebergs is influenced by wind, 
waves and streams. The likelihood of an iceberg collision in the Barents Sea is limited, but 
present, and can be a threat to (floating) offshore installations and navigation (BaSEC, 2015a). 
 
4.1.1.4 Air temperature  
Extremely low temperatures may occur in extreme conditions depending on the area in the 
Barents Sea. During operations in the winter temperatures at -30 to -34 Celsius degrees must 
be manageable. Polar lows can occur in open Arctic oceans and can lead to heavy snow, 
thunderstorms, icing and waves. It has its highest probability from November to March 
(BaSEC, 2015a). A combination of extremely low temperatures, wind and waves can cover 
offshore equipment with ice and impair their function. It influences operations as well as 
emergency responses as these conditions may hinder transportation options and possibilities 
(The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2013).   
 
4.1.1.5. Fog and seasonal daylight 
During both summer and winter months fog and seasonal daylight is common challenges. Fog 
increases during the summer as “warmer air interacts with cold water” (The Pew Charitable 
Trusts, 2013, p. 8). From mid-May to mid-August the Arctic has 24-hour daylight, but this 
changes fast during the autumn moths where the Arctic experiences complete darkness from 
mid-November to mid-January (Ibid.).  
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4.1.1.6. Remoteness 
The Arctic remoteness also poses a challenge for emergencies and clean ups as it is difficult 
and expensive (IMO, u.d.). Because of the remoteness emergency response resource are of 
importance such as transportation, public resources (such as hospitals, Sea King helicopters) 
and emergency preparedness and response systems and the Coast Guard (BaSEC, 2015b). It 
can also pose real challenges for response if an oil spill were to occur (RU-NO Barents Project, 
2014). 
 
4.2. Arctic business opportunities  
Norway’s region of the Arctic is considered 90% of Norway’s sea area (Emmerson & Glada, 
2012). Revenue generated from petroleum related industry on Norwegian offshore is taxed and 
brings income to Norway (KPMG, 2017). The Norwegian marine industry’s reputation is 
considered stable and internationalized and according to the Norwegian government strategy is 
to strengthen Norway’s profile as a leading marine nation (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 
2017). The first Norwegian offshore oil search was conducted in 1966. The Norwegian offshore 
success has its foundation in gaining knowledge from activities, regulatory development, and 
responsibility (Ptil, 2017b).  For Norway to retain its role as a secure exporter of hydrocarbons 
the Arctic has emerged as an important role in its strategy (Emmerson & Glada, 2012). By the 
end of year 2015 34 companies was operators in the Norwegian offshore (Norwegianpetroleum, 
u.d.). The Norwegian government long-term strategic plan aims amongst other to cooperate and 
reinforce the international relationships Norway has. In this lies exchange of experience and to 
capture trends of development (Ibid.). In their report it is highlighted that increasing 
internationalization of Norwegian companies that delivers commodity in oil and gas industry is 
a good business and industry policy. The global energy arena is complex and is expected to 
become more integrated in the future. To further strengthen its position the Norwegian Energy 
Partners was established to promote internationalization of a joint Norwegian based energy 
industry (Ibid.). As the Arctic is a challenging area and with different challenges gaining and 
developing knowledge and competency is important. Organizations such as the European 
Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) has taken interest and responsibility for Arctic policy. 
Other intergovernmental bodies that has done the same is for example Arctic Council, which 
was established in 1996 by Canadian initiative (Regjeringen.no, 2006). With more existing 
organizations than what has been mentioned here different interests and multilateral obligations 
makes “the near-term prospects for a consistent and practicable Arctic policy” (Tozzi, 2014, 
p. 2) unclear (Tozzi, 2014). Control and regulations through organizations mentioned is 
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important for effective risk management (Emmerson & Glada, 2012). It is also highlighted in 
Emmerson & Glada (2012, p. 7) that companies operating in Arctic areas must have “robust 
risk management frameworks and processes that adopts best practice (…)” which can be made 
through “(…) implementing best-in-class operational and safety standards (…)” (Ibid.). 
 
By environmental changes such as diminishment of ice and snow it is expected that logistics 
and infrastructure will give easier/enable access, and by this increasing the Arctic’s role in, 
amongst other, energy and mineral supply (Goverse, 2013). It will also contribute to physical, 
ecological, social and economic changes in the different Arctic areas (Regjeringen.no, 2006). 
The Arctic as an economic source has increased its attention. The Arctic is of great interest for 
various reasons: the environmental conditions, extraction of natural resources such as oil, gas, 
hydro-power, wind, fishing, whaling and sealing. Because this is a fragile environment where 
an environmental disaster could lead to global consequence actions regarding the Arctic must 
be handled with care (Emmerson & Glada, 2012). “Economic development and environmental 
sustainability in the Arctic are co-dependent” (Emmerson & Glada, 2012, p. 9). Business 
development in the Arctic is of great interest for many operators and is amongst other dependent 
on extraction of non-renewable natural resources. This gives way to complex political dilemmas 
(Ibid.).  
 
Norwegian production started in 1971, while the first findings on the Norwegian Continental 
shelf started in the 1960s (NorwegianPetroleum, u.d.). At the end of year 2016 80 fields were 
in production whereas two fields in the Barents Sea (PetroleumNorwegian, u.d.) in a diversity 
of about 50 Norwegian and foreign companies are active on the Norwegian shelf 
(NorwegianPetroleum, u.d.).  
 
4.3. Expert from the Norwegian authorities 
An interview with an expert from the Norwegian authorities provided some further insight in 
the process from the authorities point of view. 
 
Risk is defined by Ptil as the consequences of the activities, with associated uncertainty. A 
change in their guidance text has shifted to focusing in a higher degree on uncertainties rather 
than the probability and consequence of something to occur. The expert highlights that if 
petroleum companies only focus on probability, the consequence of something with a low 
probability occurs can result in a very serious accident. This is not acceptable in the point of 
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view of the authorities.  If an event in the Barents Sea, with very low probability strikes, can 
result in the area being closed- at least for a period. It does not have to be a major accident, 
but because of high political pressure the area might end up being closed. By changing focus 
to uncertainty rather than probability major accidents might be avoided according to the 
expert. That is why the authorities has changes the way they talk to the industry about risk 
management.  
 
When the southern/eastern part of the Barents Sea was opened the report to the Storting 
specified that Ptil would take initiative regarding developing knowledge related to risk and 
uncertainty elements related to activities in that area. Cooperation with the Norwegian Oil and 
Gas Association, Ptil, and the industry resulted in a report on HSE1-challenges in the High 
North. With a lot of knowledge-based projects, Ptil examines and provides information and 
data for the industry and in cooperation with the industry.  
 
The regulatory framework in Norway is said by Ptil that “it is not specific, but it describes the 
functions that needs to be fulfilled” (Expert, Norwegian Authorities, 2017) and is equal for all 
of the Norwegian offshore. The respondents emphasize that one of the most important 
framework condition is the requirements for prudent operations. There are requirements for 
risk analysis, emergency preparedness analysis, environmental risk analysis and it is expected 
that to counteract risks one need to establish barriers. The framework also emphasize that 
location specific conditions shall be considered, but is not explicitly specified in a detailed 
level in the regulation. Norwegian offshore regulations stand out in that sense as it is built in a 
way where operators have the responsibility. They have functional requirements they need to 
follow and they need to prove that what they are doing is justifiable. Other countries might 
require more detailed regulatory framework with less of a free scope.  
“It is clear that the regulations we have make very strict demands, but you have a high 
degree of a free scope for the solution you choose.” (Expert, Norwegian Authorities, 
2017). 
 
The development of new standards is done by organizations, e.g. International Organization 
for Standardization (ISO). It is an incremental process where new solutions can influence 
already existing standards or creates new standards. Implicitly in the framework and 
                                                 
1 Health, Safety and Environment 
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establishment of barriers is the dedication of new knowledge, and from this one should do 
necessary changes.  
“There is nothing surprising by not changing the regulations when entering the High 
North, but it is evident that there are different discussions, new challenges, and there 
are demands to the regulations that these challenges are met and find compensating 
measures where you identify risk or shortcomings or threats that you need to take care 
of.” (Expert, Norwegian Authorities, 2017). 
 
Regarding foreign petroleum companies entering Norwegian offshore the expert from the 
Norwegian authorities informs that it is seldom market operators without experience in the 
Norwegian offshore gets approved as operator right away. The respondent explains that a 
foreign company can be awarded licenses after a rigorous qualification process. In this 
process the foreign company becomes acquainted with the Norwegian regulations and 
requirements. At the same time the expert does not perceive a foreign company’s perception 
of risk and uncertainty as different from a Norwegian.  
 
Because of features as lower oil price, downsizing and such in the industry the last couple of 
years the subject of “changing the trend” is to turn the focus. Doing this kind of a priority 
focus the industry’s attention on becoming more aware and creating discussions.  
“It does no harm that people do not agree with us. What is very important is that 
people start discussions and take it into consideration.” (Expert, Norwegian 
Authorities, 2017). 
 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter has illuminated aspects of the Arctic and the physical environment. Factors such 
as low temperature, icing, remoteness, darkness, polar lows, Arctic storms, and visibility 
influence the operations in this area. The physical environment appears to be the biggest risk 
for petroleum companies. The expert from the Norwegian authorities has illustrated that the 
requirements for petroleum companies demands a high level of knowledge and experience of 
the petroleum companies wanting to operate in the Barents Sea. The Norwegian regulatory 
framework is not specified in a detail level, and even though it is not directly subject to 
change, the development in the industry leads to a change in new standards and regulations.   
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Chapter 5. Empirical data – Findings 
In this chapter, the empirical data from the interviews conducted will be presented as risk 
stories. The domestic and international company is presented separately to make a comparative 
understanding easier. The companies are hereafter name respectively as DomOil and InterOil. 
The stories told will first address how companies approach enterprise risk management and 
how risks are identified. Second, to address what strategic risks are perceived to be critical and 
how the risks are managed.  
 
5.1. DomOil- the domestic company 
DomOil is a Norwegian petroleum company with long experience working in different offshore 
regions as well as in the Arctic.  
 
5.1.1. Defining risk 
DomOil sees risk as the product of the probability for an event to have a consequence, 
multiplied with the consequence of the event. They view risk as a two-parted picture: it may be 
an opportunity, or it can be a threat. If the risk is perceived as a threat DomOil work to mitigate 
the threat as effectively as possible. One of the respondents explains that this is done either by 
reducing the probability for the event to happen or how to reduce the consequence if the event 
were to happen. If the risk is perceived as an opportunity DomOil’s work is to realize the 
opportunity. They do this by increasing the probability for the event to happen, or even increase 
the consequence of the event. When DomOil is looking at risk in a risk-benefit context it 
includes considering uncertainty for different outcomes and how acceptable it will be.  
 
Uncertainty is also seen by DomOil as a dynamic element in the risk aspect. “Uncertainty is a 
much broader term” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017). The respondent identifies uncertainty 
as a possible risk, but also points out that it does not have to be so. “The whole petroleum 
industry is built up about handling uncertainty” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017). As the 
respondent highlights; uncertainty is a part of all aspects of the industry and it can be related to 
such as costs, schedule, resource estimate and productivity. The respondent uses an existing oil 
platform as an example and the uncertainty of ice drifting towards it. To get a hold of the 
uncertainty regarding this, DomOil conducts statistical calculations regarding how likely it is 
that ice actually becomes a problem, and this statistical analysis becomes an input in their risk 
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evaluation. “So what I am saying is that uncertainty can be an integrated part of risk, but it 
does not have to be” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017).  
 
5.1.2. Approach to ERM 
The respondent explains that in the process of risk identification DomOil conducts many 
brainstorming sessions “where we define what is going to happen” (Manager, Unit one, 
DomOil, 2017). Here the participant are the experts on the problem at hand. The goal is 
emphasized by one of the respondents as to be sure of DomOil having the knowledge about 
what is going to happen and what the risks associated with this are. Afterwards a classification 
of identified risks based on consequences and probability is conducted. The respondent explains 
that the important thing during these kinds of workshops is to identify all the possible outcomes 
that might happen independent of the probability or consequence. To illuminate this the 
respondent describes a typical workshop that can include writing stuff on post-its. After every 
risk is laid on the table (Norwegian expression for making “something” visible) DomOil’s job 
is to evaluate the probability and consequence of the different risks that are identified in such 
workshops. From here on a “top 10” risk list can be a result of such a process. The respondent 
explains that the risk list is dependent on the complexity of the problem of discussion. One of 
the respondents finds it challenging to generalize how DomOil is working with risk in each of 
the different business units. The respondent points out that the risk list should be on the agenda 
in every leader meeting. In the same turn the respondent also points out- to its knowledge- that 
risk as a topic is an integrated part of every leader meeting. The norm is that those kinds of 
meetings is what puts the risk list on the agenda.  
 
Every decision DomOil makes requires an evaluation of risks related to the decision. The 
respondent also points out that the risk list should be dynamic because when conducting such 
workshops over hundreds of different risks can be identified and the ones appearing on the risk 
list will change accordingly.  
“(…) then it is top 10 and you work with it, and then you manage to reduce the 
probability, or you manage to reduce the consequence, and after a while the risk might 
fall out of “top 10” and instead another risk turns up (…) and a fair share of the risks 
is risks that might hit you later on, and you would want to be sure that you manage to 
pick them up when they become real” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017).  
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5.1.3. Identifying risks 
One of the respondents explains that DomOil uses internal resources regarding strategy and 
risks related to the Arctic. These internal resources make sure that different business areas 
within DomOil have identified the risks, explore how the risks are identified, and further 
pursuing the risks seen as the biggest- both from the assessments of the respective business 
areas and from advisors on Arctic as an area. The respondent explains that some of these risks 
are forwarded to the corporate level. The actual execution of doing the operations, the 
respondent explains any bigger risks are to be flagged, and try to make sure that these risks are 
taken seriously and get attention. The respondent state they split risk in two aspects; short-term 
and long-term. Both aspects are covered by DomOil, but puts focus on the long-term risks 
regarding the Arctic. Long-term risks are exemplified by the respondent as not getting access 
to certain areas, or not having right the technologies for certain areas, or some public opposition 
to what the company is doing in the future. To identify long-term risks a risk radar is used. In 
order to use this risk-radar the respondent emphasize that it requires understanding of DomOil’s 
strategy and in all of their business areas. By having dialogue with each of the business areas 
continuously and questions regarding what, how and why different risks are identified are 
subjects of high importance, and the unit include the work that has already been done and use 
their expertise on top. This process enables them to build up a view of key-risks that can affect 
the ambitions for DomOil in the long-term, and plot these into the radar. The radar is an 
illumination of how big of an issue these risks may be, and the respondent explains that it 
enables DomOil to prioritize what to tackle first. 
 
Risk management from corporate level and to the people actually doing the job is highlighted 
by one of the respondent as to entail a million things that have to be identified. The respondent 
views it as a kind of a top-down bottom-up approach. Seen from a corporate strategy point of 
view one of the respondents explains that the strategy, which looks at where the company wants 
to be, is spread down to the different business areas where they execute through their different 
operations to deliver on that strategy. Further the same respondent emphasizes that risks 
appearing at that end will be sent back up to the corporate level, and at the corporate level they 
frequently as a routine have a follow-up on all risks that could affect the company. The 
respondent comments that it is only the very serious risks that make it to the corporate level, 
but the responsibility and expectations of identifying and managing risk is present at the whole 
escalator (top-down, bottom-up) course. The DomOil top-level management also picks up risks 
that they deep dive into and spend a lot of time understanding these risks. 
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5.1.4. Critical risks  
In the next subchapters are findings regarding the strategic risks referred to in the theory 
chapter. Some contains more data than others. This will be discussed in chapter 6.  
 
5.1.4.1 Strategic risk  
Developing a corporate strategy is high level development, and one of the respondents from 
DomOil explains that the Arctic is one of the focus areas. Therefore, that strategy will support 
the corporate strategy. As this is of DomOil’s focus area the company has put down important 
resources in assessing and evaluating the Arctic. Some aspects covered is the strategy, and that 
risks identified are followed through. The unit can influence in what areas in the Arctic DomOil 
should develop in, and advise on the relevance of Arctic areas. As it is a huge sphere from 
corporate level down to field operations the respondent found it hard to have a single answer 
for any of the questions I asked, but in general DomOil try to make sure risks are identified 
from any angle, and that risks are sufficiently assessed and mitigated. 
 
DomOil is very conscious about having a strong scientific-based approach to show that what 
they are doing is acceptable. The respondent points out that it is important for the company to 
have the right science and facts. Therefore, since they have all the right technologies in place, 
the respondent illuminates that their biggest risks by operating in the Arctic is the social license 
to operate, climate and to make it commercial. 
 
5.1.4.2. Reputational risk 
One of the respondents explains that overall a petroleum company must be willing to take risks 
since “in everything we do risk is involved” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017). This is not 
limited to either the Arctic environment nor other environmental aspects, but risk in general. 
DomOil’s risk willingness is dependent on the consequences. For example, DomOil is very 
aware of a great political interest in the areas in the High North and explains that there exist 
strict requirements for companies to understanding of undertaking risks there. One of the 
respondents emphasize that the impact of consequences from some of the risks sets the 
company’s risk willingness to very low when it comes to safety and HMS as the consequences 
of such is greater than the real ones. “We are the ones that have the most to lose by not knowing 
this in connection with a development” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017).   
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For DomOil the rise of social media, where perceptions belonging to public oppositions and 
NGOs2 are being spread quickly, the scientific fact’s matter. “We see we could have all the facts 
but we wouldn’t be listened to because the voices of- the perceptions of oppositions and NGOs 
are spread so quickly through social media (…)” (Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017).  How 
to gain a social license to operate is a central question for the company. Even though they have 
all the facts for a scientific license to operate, getting stakeholders to understand and expect that 
the company are managing the technical and environmental risks, in terms of risk benefit, is 
really difficult and a huge challenge for the company- in the Barents Sea as elsewhere. There 
is a huge amount of public engagement related to the Arctic areas, and because some voices 
driven by perceptions, and not facts, account a lot louder than others, is a real challenge for 
DomOil. The focus on perceptions, social media and the social license to operate is emphasized 
throughout the whole interview, and is regarded as a risk in almost any case DomOil talks about.  
 “Social media is a very big risk for what we do” (Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017).  
 
An increasing concern in DomOil, in addition to other countries and oppositions, are policies 
of companies operating in the Arctic. There could be differences in how different nations and 
companies are conducting their activities, and might be doing things DomOil necessarily do not 
agree with both in the ways they present them and approaches to media and oppositions. This 
again can negatively influence people’s perceptions and get them negative to the Norwegian 
sector. So, the different ways different Arctic countries and companies work can reflect 
incorrectly on the way the domestic company works. 
 
DomOil are very aware of how perceptions infiltrate different stakeholders. The Arctic Council 
is used as an example by one of the respondents; sometimes the Arctic Council can have reports 
made by non-Arctic expert, but gets a stamp as an Arctic Council report. This report may not 
reflect the latest research and understanding, and may therefore become a concern. There are 
different views, and getting industry knowledge and competence into the Arctic Council 
assessments is challenging for DomOil, but they try to involve in cooperation with the 
organization. The respondent exemplifies the concern in by how media can pick up information, 
and sometimes take it out of context and put it on display. This can in turn feed negative 
perceptions already existing about the Arctic and create unnecessary risks. Especially as the 
Arctic is great for selling newspapers. 
                                                 
2 NGOs = Non-Governmental Organizations 
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5.1.4.3. Climate risk 
When talking about the Arctic DomOil is very conscious that there is not only one Arctic, but 
many different Arctic. In different parts of the Arctic the company look at the level of 
challenge and timeline developed. DomOil has chosen to categorize the Arctic in three 
degrees: workable, stretch, and extreme. As different Arctic varies, the same goes for areas 
within the Arctic. As one of the respondent highlights; the environment in the Barents Sea is 
very different from environment in other Arctic seas, and the open area in the Barents Sea is 
categorized as “workable”. The same respondent explains that being classified as “workable” 
means that the company has pretty much all the technologies needed, and the extra 
capabilities needed can be developed short-term; in 5-10 years for instance. “It doesn’t mean 
we have to invest in research for 50 years before we can do anything” (Manager, Unit two, 
DomOil, 2017). 
 
Gaining knowledge about the physical conditions is important for DomOil, and they have a 
scientific-based approach. Regarding the Barents Sea and understanding the physical 
environment one of the respondents explains that it is an area where the company has a lot of 
data available. So, in that sense one of the respondents illuminates the risk and uncertainty 
aspect by it being more uncertain how much oil there is underground in the Barents Sea, than 
the evolvement of the physical environment. For DomOil perceptions about the Arctic is 
relevant, and the Arctic in general is hugely respective. Even though the Barents Sea is classed 
as “workable” after thorough environmental assessments, and DomOil has the technologies to 
manage the area, one of the respondent explains that environmental factors such as distance, 
remoteness, darkness, polar lows, waves, and heavy weather needs to be managed. Ice in the 
Barents Sea are very unlikely to appear and certainly not every year, but in terms of effective 
ice operations they need to be prepared. It could cause accidents as major oil spills, but also a 
risk in their normal operations. Other effects of climate change such as presence of fish 
mammals and birds, and their influence on the eco system, must be understood and managed 
by DomOil. As the Arctic is a long-term operation, many aspects need to be included in the 
portfolio of the company.  
“We’re not in the Arctic cause it’s the Arctic, we’re in the Arctic because it is one of the 
most attractive places to be. It competes in terms of prioritization, all the other 
geographical areas, it just so happens that the Arctic is sufficiently attractive- but we 
want to be there” (Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017).   
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In addition to economic value considerations such as carbon tax in pricing and valuations, as 
well as carbon footprint in potential business opportunities, one of the respondents highlights 
that DomOil have to fact in climate change. This is another careful factor in the Arctic strategy 
of DomOil and in its valuations. One of the respondents points out that climate risk can be 
evaluated in terms of where they are, how long-term it is, how much it costs, and can also be 
linked to the social license to operate where concerns regarding oil spill, which is a local risk, 
and questions about their presence in the Arctic should be evaluated as the Arctic for DomOil 
is a being fairly long-term involvement and investment.  
 
5.1.4.4. Economic risk  
No special emphasis is made by any of the respondents from DomOil on economic risk. The 
closest to a finding in such manner is how production drives costs. From DomOil’s perspective, 
the Barents Sea and production there drives costs because of the infrastructure as it is far away 
from land and it can be cold where low temperature is a bigger problem during the winter than 
ice is. Even toilet paper can in such case be seen as a risk as the respondents highlights because 
of the transportation costs are present. At the same time the reservoirs is shallow and relatively 
easy wells to drill which makes it cheaper. One of the respondents highlights that there are more 
complicated wells in the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea compared to the Barents Sea.  
“Everything that concerns a bump to pipe, toilet paper, everything, right. It costs more 
money to get it out there than a field closer- but that is included in an economic analysis 
before deciding to develop a field. So that it is colder in the Barents Sea is kind of not a 
risk but a physical fact- that is how it is. You must pay for warmer mittens there than 
you have to further south” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017).  
 
5.1.4.5. Regulatory risk 
Understanding the environment might have impact on both the regulatory- and environmental 
framework for DomOil. One of the respondents uses professional discussions with the 
Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority Norway as an example; if the authorities requires 
DomOil to treat the statistics the company has found in another way they are already being 
used, it may become a risk as there can be consequences as for example higher costs and change 
in design of installations. The respondent further exemplifies this with ice management; it 
requires special climatic and atmospherically circumstances for ice to arrive in the open area in 
the Barents Sea. “It is almost like a non-entity” (Manager, Unit one, DomOil, 2017). At the 
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same time, there might be rules for ice management as for example having a boat stand-by for 
ice management just in case. The regulatory risk arises if the Safety Petroleum Authority 
Norway puts a requirement regarding having a boat on stand-by for ice management.  
 
Another regulatory risk for DomOil is competition amongst different institutions and players 
in the regulatory system in Norway. As the different institutions consider themselves having 
the leading expertise in their specialized areas, these actors can end up competing rather than 
working together. This makes it difficult for DomOil in certain cases. There are huge amounts 
of assessments in beforehand of applying for a license where the license is based on evaluations 
of how the company can explore, develop, produce, and create commercial value. DomOil 
experienced an example: after the opening assessments and licenses nominated and rewarded, 
their next step was to apply for drilling. The Norwegian Environmental Agency cleared the 
drilling, but in the same turn also put a time restriction where drilling only could be conducted 
in a certain time of the year. One of the respondents explains that such restrictions could affect 
the whole reason for being in those licenses, and could potentially throw out the whole money 
case for that license. In this example, it all worked out all right, but the competitive aspect in 
such industry it can become a risk to the whole attractiveness of being in an area. The 
respondent emphasizes that any restrictions on a license should be forwarded when awarding 
licenses and not when someone pushes an opinion forward.   
 
On a global perspective DomOil sees the Norwegian regulatory in the sense of a science and 
research approach, as “second to none” (Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017). Norway is 
“absolutely the best place to be in the Arctic” (Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017). As more 
complex challenges evolve in the North close to the East and the polar front, “which is very 
messed up in the regulatory system and in the actual government management plan- so messed 
up, I mean, it’s just beyond hope” (Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017), having to deal with 
different authorities with different views and opinions DomOil perceives this as a potential risk. 
Also, in relations to the management plan which has an update for year 2020 in Norway, it is 
important for DomOil to already now be focusing on risks and doing it properly. One of the 
respondents explains that even though production from any fields will not be conducted yet, 
adjustments and considerations needs to be of current interest a lot earlier than before getting 
to the actual point of development. This to not make it unnecessarily challenging for DomOil’s 
operations in the Barents Sea. “So, we have to be far ahead of ourselves” (Manager, Unit two, 
DomOil, 2017).  
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One of the respondents compares Norway to the state Alaska where the regulatory authorities 
are functioning as enforcements. In terms of such the Norwegian authorities’ way of execution 
stands out as in the Norwegian offshore, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (Ptil) is 
perceived by DomOil to have a firm, but more stretching approach towards the industry. In 
general, DomOil feel happy about the regulatory system.  
 
5.1.4.6. Political risk 
Understanding all the potential environmental impact is very important. The real risk there 
explained by one of the respondents, in terms of consequence, is that if DomOil doesn’t 
consider these aspects and do their business in the Arctic properly, the regulatory framework 
might become stricter. This can in turn result in companies losing the ability to develop in the 
Barents Sea and/or strict shut down conditions. In addition to this DomOil is aware about how 
the perceptions, as mentioned earlier, also color the public view. It is explained by one of the 
respondents that organizations and foreign countries have expressed concerns about, for 
example, an oil spill in the Barents Sea. So far, these stakeholders have trusted the Norwegian 
administration handling its sovereign sector. As the climate change is becoming a global issue, 
administrations such as the European Parliament are addressing their concerns, and if these 
stakeholders decide to push their views DomOil sees this as something that can affect Norway 
as a country. Changes in policies is exemplified by the respondent. DomOil seems concerned 
that acts of public, and other countries policies and views, affect their ability in Norway- and 
that it is no longer a sovereign issue.  
“(…) They don’t like the fact that we’re drilling in the Barents Sea cause they’re 
thinking it’s causing climate change, so the Arctic has become a global signifier of 
climate change where the view is- the perception- in order to mitigate climate change 
we shouldn’t be in the Arctic” (Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017).  
 
DomOil recognizes the activities in the Barents Sea to easily become a bargaining factor within 
the political system. One of the respondents explains that Norway has a very fact-based 
approach where the companies do the science and assessments to show that what they are doing 
is responsible. After this the company then move forward in the process, but the respondent 
emphasize that perceptions and the social license to operate is increasingly affecting Norway. 
As an example, one of the respondents points out that politicians do not necessarily have to be 
experts of the Arctic nor oil and gas to become leader or responsible for such department, and 
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are as other people equally receptive to perceptions and social media. It is being pointed out 
that politicians want to be elected. The politicians therefore respond to their electorate, and one 
of the respondent, a bit discouraged, points out that the politicians are adjusting their approaches 
in order to get votes. These adjustments may not be scientifically correct. Further the respondent 
has noted some of the debates within political institutions about the Arctic to be depressing and 
scientifically unsubstantiated. The lack of facts is missing in the heart of the discussion. In 
addition to this, one of the respondents points out that the younger politicians entering the 
political arena seems to go greener, and maybe don’t have the exposure to geopolitics and the 
global perspective. The concern for DomOil is that some voices account a lot louder than others. 
 
DomOil points out that they do not lobby in Norway the way they would be doing in for 
example the USA. They want to be making sure that the right things are focused on and that 
Norwegian policies does not end up being individual people’s perceptions. But how to make 
sure of this staying on track without being seen as a company trying to lobby or steer is a 
struggle for DomOil. 
 
5.1.4.7. Country risk 
As they have many international operations all over the world it would have been interesting 
exploring how DomOil considers the different risk aspects included in country risk. But, as 
DomOil is a domestic company, country risk is not seen relevant for this particular study by 
the author.  
 
5.1.5. Managing risks 
As explained earlier the process for being an operator and/or licensee requires following the 
body of rules already existing and providing the Ministry with certainty that the petroleum 
company has done all measures necessary regarding the requirements in the Norwegian 
offshore. For DomOil, which is an established actor, the process to gaining 
approval/authorization and licenses might not be too time consuming. One of the respondents 
explains that development of oil fields is a huge investment requires gathering of data and 
knowledge by the company. This is not alone done by using statistics, but by conducting 
seismology samples to understand what kind of reserves the company is dealing with and what 
kind of area they are dealing with. DomOil try and build competence and move stepwise; they 
don’t jump straight in the deep end, but take on a bit more challenge gradually. The company 
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have built experience and technology, and they “don’t move faster than technology allows us” 
(Manager, Unit two, DomOil, 2017).   
 
During the evolvement of the petroleum industry DomOil as experienced a shift from not 
sharing knowledge, to an understanding that all actors is in the same boat. If other companies 
made a huge blunder then it also made its impact on other in the same industry. Because the 
domino effect of such is present, and companies are aware of this, it seems to have bettered the 
cooperation. The respondent highlights that DomOil is not served by having knowledge that 
another petroleum company does not have regarding for example the physical environment. It 
is pointed out by one of the respondent that the only situation where competition is relevant is 
in occasions where DomOil bids for exploratory license. In such DomOil needs to have more 
information than their competitors.  
“It is important that the only occasion where there actually are competition is in 
connection with exploratory licenses (…) – when we need to know that we know more 
than our competitors that increases our access to exploratory areas” (Manager, Unit 
one, DomOil, 2017).  
 
As an illustration of how multidimensional the Arctic is DomOil have put down much resources 
looking cross-boarders to see how it all fit together. This to make sure everything was pulled 
together across the strategy through to technology, to the license to operate, to stakeholder 
acceptance and “try and pull those together and see the risks and the challenges” (Manager, 
Unit two, DomOil, 2017). The respondent highlights this as a key enabler for the company to 
move more robustly ahead in the Arctic, to make the right decisions and to be prepared.  
 
One of the respondent also expresses that the companies on Norwegian offshore has different 
expertise. The domestic company has much competency regarding understanding of the 
physical environment. Despite of many smaller companies also competing in the offshore 
industry the growing development of the expertise in the bigger companies such as the company 
makes it difficult for the smaller to gain the competitive advantage they seem to be looking for.  
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5.2. InterOil- the international company 
An international licensee holder in the Norwegian offshore with most of its exploratory 
experience from Europe and Asia.    
 
5.2.1. Defining risks  
Risk for InterOil defined as the probability for an event to occur multiplied with the 
consequence. Risk is potentially positive as well as negative, and refers to an event. InterOil 
has defined risk, but not uncertainty. The procedure the company uses is aimed specific towards 
events, and therefore the term uncertainty is not defined. Uncertainties are considered in their 
procedures by the work of regarding probability. Recently the Petroleum Safety Authority 
Norway (Ptil) started focusing a lot more on uncertainties in the industry, and one of the 
respondents highlights that uncertainty have gotten more focus within InterOil as well. Further 
one of the respondents explain that the manageability and uncertainty requires additional 
analysis in different situations. The plan is that in the next upgrade of the risk assessment 
uncertainty and manageability will gain focus as well as other areas that exist in their procedure. 
One of the respondents explains that in each of the risks InterOil is, or can be, exposed for, the 
company question itself whether the risk is manageable and if they can influence the risk. If the 
answer is yes then they have the ability to reduce the consequence. If the answer is no then they 
as a company need to consider carrying out measures to influence it or just let it be as it is. 
Same goes for uncertainty. This influence the risk picture as it can increase or decrease the risk.  
“I believe risk, risk, what we divide risk and uncertainty, is that risk refers more to an 
 event, while uncertainty refers to an expected outcome. Or the uncertainty towards an 
 outcome (...) We have not defined uncertainty- we have defined risk, but we have not 
 defined uncertainty, so when I say we divide those is it because I mentally view 
uncertainty on another side- this is not specific in the procedure, but the procedure is 
aimed towards concrete events.” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017) 
 
5.2.2. Approach to ERM 
Identifying risk in InterOil is done by different departments in the company since the different 
personnel there have different types of competency. Therefore, as one of the respondents 
explains, each department should manage their own risks. In other occasions where subjects 
such as company risk is focused on, the whole company gathers to identify and assess risk 
together. During the brainstorming, all risks are written down and evaluated on basis of whether 
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it is of current interest or not. All of the company’s employees participates in this particular 
example. In the evaluation, the respondent explains that InterOil uses a risk matrix based on 
their assessment on current fields. Risk is divided in high, medium and low level risk colored 
in respectively red, yellow and green. This is known as the first step InterOil calls “plan and 
perform risk assessment” where the whole risk picture is taken into account. Next step is “treat 
risk”. The risk picture is assessed through the ALARP (as low as reasonably practicable)- 
principle. Questions such as which mitigating actions is needed to reduce risk, what kinds of 
investments should take place in order to reduce risk is on actual. The ALARP-principle applies 
for each risk assessed. 
 
Risk assessment in InterOil is a topic in every leader meeting which is once every month. One 
of the respondent highlights that information specific meetings, meeting where all employees 
of the company participates, is every two weeks. There exists no routine for risk update, but the 
respondent explains that if there appears relevant information this becomes a is subject on every 
leader meeting.  
 
5.2.3. Identifying risks 
Probability and impact is a part of the calculations of risk and are used as estimates in their risk 
maps. This is prominent in the work of reservoir estimates and analysis tools such as Monte 
Carlo or Six Sigma are used. One of the respondents explains that the risk register that InterOil 
uses in different procedures defines the roles that are supposed to administrate the different 
defined risks. Managing director, office administrator and HR-manager are so far the only 
explicitly defined roles in the procedure in risk assessment system. In the same turn the 
respondent points out that the system InterOil uses makes it possible for both internal as well 
as external actors to edit in it. The respective actor does not necessarily have to be an employee 
to be granted permission. For InterOil this is a way to effectively include resources in for 
example projects from anyplace in the world. This risk procedure contains chapters detailed 
with definitions, participants and focus areas. This kind of system allows information sharing 
both internally and externally. This enables everybody working in, or with, InterOil to have the 
same insight of information in an effective way. In the same time the procedure is used for 
development internally as well. The respondent further explains that in given project or 
procedures the participants and definitions might be limited. The basis of InterOil’s risk 
procedure is supposed to be generic where the same principles are used all over, but as the 
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respondent from InterOil points out; different aspects are considered at different times by the 
actor responsible for the operation in the risk assessment procedure.  
“(…) the procedure is not relevant in relation to risk assessment regarding the well 
program then the HR manager- he has probably something to contribute with as well- 
spud personnel, geologists, geophysics and those who designs wells and everything 
enters the picture” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017). 
The risk procedure list is updated relatively and the respondent explains that the risk assessment 
is developed based on best practices and how things are done in the industry. 
 
5.2.4. Critical risks  
Following in the next subchapters are findings regarding the strategic risks referred to in the 
theory chapter.  
 
5.2.4.1. Strategic risk  
In the question regarding considerations InterOil has done related to strategic risk, one the 
respondents explain that a huge part of their strategy is based on the High North. InterOil 
wants to develop more in the Norwegian Barents Sea, and explains that this corresponds with 
the mother company’s strategy regarding expanding international. Considerations done by 
InterOil is to analyze what risks are related to the High North. Analysis on infrastructure, 
planned field development and political risks are factors one of the respondent highlights. In 
the same turn the respondent also points out that all risk assessments and analysis cannot be 
provided to me. But in general, InterOil has analyzed whether this can be a show stopper for 
the company. To further secure InterOil’s strategy an external advisor company conducted a 
benchmarking on InterOil’s strategy towards other petroleum companies.  
 
5.2.4.2. Reputational risk 
InterOil expresses that they try to considerate reputational risk in all their activities. In their risk 
map it is how their home country operates and is perceived by the public that is noted as a 
reputational risk. Consequences such as challenges with recruiting is emphasized by one the 
respondents as a risk attached to reputation. Even though InterOil is not directly connected to 
the actions that the home country conducts it is something that they consider in their risk 
assessment. Focus on reputation in different aspects of risk considerations are highlighted 
within the organization. It is challenging to manage and restore reputation if lost, and is seen as 
one of the most important risks.  
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“(…) regardless whether we are a part of it or not it contributes to, or can contribute 
to our  reputation (…) that it can have consequences compared to especially on the 
recruiting side,  but also even though the Norwegian authorities are extremely 
objective and clinical in how they manage things in relation to the regulations, it is still 
people that sits and handles things at the authorities that probably also is colored by 
the general press” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017). 
 
5.2.4.3. Climate risk 
InterOil’s evaluations regarding the Barents Sea considering seismic samples, analyzing pools 
and be open for possibilities are done by one of the departments in the company. InterOil views 
the Barents Sea as a lower risk area compared to the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. This is 
because of milder weather conditions, commercial expectations towards findings are higher in 
the Barents Sea and more shallow reservoirs. At the same time some specific challenges exists: 
immigration of sea bird are one of these. Also, even though the respondent describes the 
weather conditions in the Barents Sea as milder in connection with wave length and wind, some 
challenges such as polar low pressures and temperature can occur. Challenges with ice is also 
a risk factor; even though there has not been recorded ice in the areas around Kropfjell and Bear 
Island (Bjørnøya) there is a statistical chance for ice to occur during the winter. In total InterOil 
does not view the physical environment in the Barents Sea as a risky area.  
“But generally speaking, in total the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea is a low risk 
area, but with certain challenges. In some parts of the year immigration of sea bird in 
some areas and – but that is very specific things and many environmental analyses has 
been conducted. The weather is kinder than the Norwegian Sea and the North Sea, 
commercial lower risk because of lower drilling costs since the reservoirs are shallower 
and the water is relatively shallow, and you expect higher findings. So, sum a sum a rum 
the Barents Sea- we did a benchmarking of the Barents Sea against other offshore 
regions in the world, and the Barents Sea is probably the most attractive offshore area 
in the world to be in as an oil company.” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017).  
 
5.2.4.4. Economic risk  
In addition to shallow well drilling my respondent from the company also emphasize the 
taxation system in Norway, where the community gets 78 percent of the surplus, having a risk 
moderating effect. In turn one of the respondents argues that this leads to the Barents Sea being 
less sensitive for the ups and downs in the oil price. Investments made in the Barents Sea, 
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because of the need for less capital, the respondent highlights how it removes some of the risk 
for an investor and puts one faster in a position to make money. If the investor is risk averse, 
which many are, the Barents Sea is relatively speaking a comfortable place to invest.  
“This means that in a developmental phase will have less need for capital requirements 
and you will from the moment you start producing faster get in a position where you 
have a positive cashflow. So you remove a lot of risk for those who invest. On the flip 
side of it is of course that you don’t get much back in the earning period since the 
community gets this (…) but the effect you gain a setting where you have relatively low 
financial risk, low capital demand, fast in an earning position. Yes, you lose a lot of the 
potential surplus, but it removes your risk both on the expense side and- and it sounds 
weird when I say removes risk on the income side, but you are not that exposed for 
fluctuation. If the oil price goes up here than the most of it, almost 80 %, goes to the 
community. So you actually just buffer on the 20 %. So you have little joy of, as oil 
company not society, but we do as oil company have less joy of an increase in oil price 
in the Barents Sea than we have in other places in the world. On the other side are we 
less exposed for a decrease in oil price.” (Leader, InterOil, 2017).  
 
InterOil has also perceived a general trend where more of the American market operators retreat 
back to the States to deal with shale oil. One of the respondents highlights that there are also 
change in other market structures where companies who were investing in upstream business 
retreat to its core business. In addition to this, cases of smaller exploratory companies which 
business model has been to find and operate more effectively than the bigger actors, and sell 
their finding to the bigger oil companies. Now other actors, both national such as Statoil and 
Aker BP, and international, that has experience and capital find oil independently, makes less 
need for the smaller companies. The Barents Sea is a long-term operation and requires huge 
investments. “(…) Then you need a lot of money to develop this. It is not for the local sausage 
kiosk on Ørlandet.” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017). 
 
5.2.4.5. Political risks  
Considerations identified so far regarding political risk that InterOil focuses on are in 
connection with the Norwegian tax office, the Paris Agreement that Norway has ratified, 
licensing in the Barents Sea and the political powers from Governmental changes due to 
election autumn 2017. The respondent points out that political risk belongs to the corporate 
level and is on the whole managed by the general manager in InterOil. The company has also 
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two-parted the political risk, where they have one aspect related to definitions of the framework, 
and the other one is related to compliance of the framework. The compliance of the framework 
is by InterOil seen as regulatory risk, and will be highlighted in the next chapter. One of the 
respondent points out the project BaSEC3 is a competent cooperative organization amongst the 
petroleum companies where different regulatory requirements that the petroleum industry needs 
to be aware of are registered. The project is not perceived as fully developed by InterOil. 
InterOil is positive to the increasing cooperation in the High North, but believes there is still 
room for improvement. 
 
5.2.4.6. Regulatory risk  
In their procedure one of the respondents explains that compliance lists up different laws and 
regulations that the company needs to follow. Assessing what kind of demands present and how 
the company is fulfilling its role in comparison to these are of subject in a compliance matrix. 
In this matrix evaluation factors/criteria are measured in three degrees; unacceptable, 
controllable or if it does not have any risk element what so ever. These constitute the risk levels 
in the compliance matrix. Changes in the legislation might become a risk if for example the 
government decides to increase taxation of CO24. As this has happened before, the respondent 
points out that InterOil need to evaluate how it affects the company if it happens again as it can 
influence the financial aspect of developing a field. 
 
Cross-border coordination of activities in the Barents Sea is something InterOil emphasize as 
something the petroleum industry can profit from. Especially harmonization of regulations is 
illuminated as an action that is needed in the industry for petroleum companies to benefit from 
other countries expertise. The respondent uses the North Sea as an example. Here coordination 
of activities between Great Britain and Norway has been a subject the last couple of decades. 
According to the respondent this structure has not been handled especially effective as the use 
of rigs from the English side cannot be used on the Norwegian side. In general the respondent 
emphasizes that the cooperation in the High North could be better and is preoccupied with 
utilizing resources between Norway and Russia. One of the respondents highlights that if the 
                                                 
3 Barents Sea Exploration Collaboration (BaSEC) is a collaboration between Statoil, Eni Norge, Engie, Lundin 
and OMV and includes 16 operating companies. (Norsk olje & gass, u.d.).   
 
4 CO2 = carbon dioxide 
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regulations are not harmonized between the Russian and the Norwegian in the Barents Sea the 
coordination of resources might become a risk. Even though the respondent doesn’t view itself 
as an expert in the area, the information from colleagues and the industry has highlighted 
(current political) sanctions as challenges for cooperation in the High North. The respondent 
illuminates that harmonization of regulatory framework is not something that is done overnight. 
It is something that requires work from a company’s perspective as well as on a governmental 
level- and it takes time.  
“And I am talking about resources such as for example if there are different regulations 
on rigs on Norwegian and Russian side, then a Russian rig cannot immediately be on 
the Norwegian side and the same the other way around. You may not if you are out 
flying with a helicopter – let’s say there would occur a need to pick a person up from 
somewhere that is hurt or ill or something like that, then you cannot immediately land 
a Russian helicopter on a Norwegian rig, or a Norwegian helicopter on a Russian rig. 
There might be differences in technical demands, there may be differences in banal 
things such as systems to tank fuel, it is more of a – what can I say – if you get it right 
then you’ll experience an upside because you get to utilize the resources in a significant 
way, but if you don’t then the costs in the operations will probably be higher, and one 
is less competitive as a region. So, it is more of a lost opportunity than a real risk” 
(Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017).  
 
One of the respondents points out differences in communication and structures from neighbor 
countries compared to Norway. If there were to occur an emergency InterOil sees challenges 
with these differences. Even though there exists cross-border cooperation in case of emergency, 
the differences in structures can impose a challenge and there is much to gain from an 
improvement.   
“There already exists agreement to travel across the Russian borders if there is an 
emergency, but we believe there is a lot to gain through improvement of this. It is 
differences in communication, structures, leadership structures, report structure on 
Russian side compared to Norwegian side (…)” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017). 
 
5.2.3.7. Country risk 
InterOil perceives the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate and the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy as clinical and objective actors. Though they are a foreign company in Norwegian 
offshore one of the respondents points out that they have been welcomed by the authorities in 
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different forums where topics such as cooperation has been on agenda. InterOil highlights how 
the Norwegian petroleum industry in terms of sharing of information and openness between 
companies, is different from other offshore areas. This cooperation in the Norwegian offshore 
is important for InterOil to further pursue.  
 
As the mother company is foreign, InterOil needs to follow the requirements the mother 
company impose. One of the respondents explains that their management system follows both 
the Norwegian regulations, but also the regulations from the mother company. InterOil must 
therefore, as in a high degree as it is possible, in their formal management system and 
procedures follow the requirements the mother company sets. So, as long as this is not in 
conflict with Norwegian requirements InterOil fulfills this in the terms in the host country as 
well as in the foreign.  
“(…) we need to follow the demands from- when we form our management system which 
risk evaluation is a central part of, we start with the Norwegian regulations. These we 
need to follow. Then we look at the regulations the parent company impose, and we 
follow these as long as they’re not in conflict with Norwegian regulations.” (Manager, 
Area X, InterOil, 2017).  
 
Regarding improvements of structures the company highlights a conversation with the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy. The guidelines the authorities follow are the ones stated by the Arctic 
Council which says that “every country is responsible for making sure of the safety and 
preparedness in each own territory.” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017). As my respondent 
highlights “it does not say a word about how to cooperate across. (…) I believe we have a long 
way to go.” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 2017). 
 
5.2.5. Managing risks 
InterOil’s mother company has a strategy that is developed on a company level. InterOil’s 
strategy is developed accordingly to that. The mother company has its business strategy, and 
with this as a basis for InterOil’s business strategy is formed in supporting its mother 
company’s strategy. The mother company focus for example on international development 
and growth. This influence the business strategy of InterOil. One of the respondents explains 
that to support the mother company’s strategy InterOil evaluates what they can do. This puts 
focus for InterOil on questions such as how many licenses they should aim for and how they 
want to develop in different projects. InterOil’s strategy is in a huge part based on the High 
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North and this is accordingly to the mother company’s strategy to internationalize. One of the 
respondents explains that their strategy is analyzed and assessed. Risks such as infrastructure, 
field development, political challenges related to it were analyzed. Arctic areas and strategy 
are on the whole analyzed through the same process as explained under the previous 
paragraph “risk and uncertainty”. As a part of developing InterOil’s strategy workshops were 
conducted, and these led to an analysis where the main risk elements were highlighted. 
Afterwards InterOil hired an independent analysis- and advisory company to conduct a 
benchmarking of their strategy against other companies’ strategies in the same industry. 
“So what we did was that we got [external actor] to do a benchmarking of our risks- no, 
not our risks- they did a benchmarking of our strategy against other companies (…) 
that made a type of traffic light compared the risk for implemented strategy based on 
what other companies have done in Norway (…) So even though it is not a risk analysis 
compared to the risk procedure it is a risk analysis compared to see where we put the 
list and what we have being capable to implement before.” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 
2017).  
 
In the company’s strategy focus on how the company can differentiate itself is present. This is 
important when applying for licenses. The mother company has huge amount of data gathered 
from expeditions and experience in the Arctic. According to one of the respondents the 
knowledge and experience that InterOil and its mother company has is something that 
differentiates InterOil. In addition by having experience in the Arctic and having operations 
there can be used directly in the Norwegian Barents Sea. InterOil views this to as a possible 
contribution to improved coordination of preparedness planning and leadership. “It is really 
one of our selling points towards the industry and authorities” (Manager, Area X, InterOil, 
2017).  
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Chapter 6. Discussion 
The aim of this research has been to study how petroleum companies identify and manage 
risks in the Barents Sea. The empirical data reviles how companies approach enterprise risk 
management (ERM) and how they identify risks, and what strategic risks are perceived to be 
critical and how these risks are managed. The study reviles two major findings. First, 
companies approach ERM in a holistic manner, but that one of the case company approach 
risk identification in a more planned manner and the other in a more accidental manner. 
Second, how critical risks are handled differ in the two case companies. One company is 
working in a long-term aspect while the other one sees risk in a short-term aspect. The 
following sections will discuss the major findings by combining theory and evidences.  
 
6.1. Holistic approach to ERM 
This study shows that both DomOil and InterOil have a holistic approach to enterprise risk 
management (ERM). Risk is being assessed at all levels during their workshops including a big 
part of its company employees.  The combination of strategy and risk assessment from both 
DomOil and InterOil fits with COSO’s definition. Data shows that risk is being assessed at all 
levels of DomOil where they have a top-down, bottom-up approach. Having this escalator 
communication of risk enables identification at more level than one, and even top managers are 
willingly to deep dive into risks that is of high importance. The frequent meetings and risk 
follow up in both companies where leadership meeting, information meeting and risk 
assessments substantiate are present in both companies. InterOil points out that departments 
should assess specific risks related to their area of competency, but in the wholesome inclusion 
in the overall level indicates a holistic approach. This is according to COSO’s definition of 
ERM that binds strategy to identifying risk. DomOil appears to have an approach to risk in a 
higher degree related to a risk-based internal control imperative, and InterOil maybe being more 
concerned about risks being identified to their mother company’s visions- and in such terms 
relate to Mikes (2009) a shareholder drive imperative. Both companies appear to coincide with 
Bromley et al. (2015) where incorporating strategic risks in their risk portfolio, and considering 
risk with both a negative side as well as a positive.  
 
As risk management is according to Lam (2003) to ensure a risk level in an acceptable range, 
and as Power (2004) highlights; values, ideal, accountability and responsibility, in additional to 
technical analytical practice, one can say that risk management is a complexity of different 
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factors. Including people from all over the companies to understand their tasks in accordance 
with the corporate strategy and expectations to communications across the whole organization, 
risk management could be done in a dynamic and holistic way of approaching risk. DomOil 
emphasizes how they cooperate with the top-level of the company and across business units to 
be sure that risks are being pursued and seen in a broader and bigger risk picture, and that it 
gets the attention it needs.  
 
Neither DomOil nor InterOil has a definite way of answering how they define uncertainty, but 
perception of risk and how one chooses to conceptualize (Arena, et al., 2010) it into risk, is 
evident from the interviews that both companies does. As the latest change of focus on 
uncertainty by the regulatory authority, InterOil highlights that “uncertainty” and 
“manageability” has gotten two columns in their risk matrix, but as the changes is fairly recently 
it has not been tried in action so far. Regardless of what kind of terms the companies uses, 
through the leadership meetings, information meeting, and workshops and brainstorming, 
indicates that uncertainty has a way of being conceptualized into the risk aspect. To what degree 
and in a more detailed way is rather, ironically enough, uncertain.  
 
6.2. Risk identification  
To illustrate how the two petroleum companies identifies risk, the following sections will 
discuss their approaches. I argue that risk identification in DomOil tends to be more planned, 
whilst in InterOil the risk identification may in a higher degree be accidental. As mentioned in 
the previous paragraph data shows that both companies have workshops and brainstorming to 
identify a whole spectrum of risks. DomOil conducts workshops where all kinds of risks are 
being written on post-its just to unkennel everything. Same goes for InterOil that conducts 
brainstorming that at times includes all of the company’s employees. They can have themes for 
the brainstorming, and all risks, whether it is of current interest or not, is being written down. I 
argue that these workshops will help to enable identification of different risks, but is highly 
dependent on the further assessment in evaluating the probability and consequence of such 
risks. Walker et al. (2002) found in their study the companies made an effort to gather groups 
across business units to discuss objectives and identify risks, and included qualified people to 
understand risk better. Both DomOil and InterOil does so. Both companies highlight that they 
have leadership meetings once a month where risks are put on agenda. It is though rather 
uncertain whether all parts of DomOil’s business units have the risk map as an initial priority 
in each leadership meeting, but as data says; the norm is that it should be.  
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Data shows that a result from these workshops in DomOil is a risk radar, and in InterOil a risk 
matrix. Further in this study this will be referred to as risk maps. Similar for both is that they 
rank risks based on consequence, probability and in which way they are either positive or 
negative. As the risks are not static both companies respond to their respective risk maps in a 
dynamic way. The purpose is to be sure to manage and pick these up when they become real. 
DomOil highlighted that to use the risk map one must understand the company strategy. InterOil 
never commented such.  
 
6.2.1. Planned or accidental risk identification  
Data shows that InterOil has no exact routine for updating the risk map, but it is rather more 
based on risk appearance; the map is updated frequently as risk kind of turns up. Just to 
specify for further discussion: InterOil has a data collaborative software program referred to 
as risk system. Risk routine is how InterOil uses this program and follows their own norms to 
such. The totality of these two is referred to as the risk procedure. As data shows the company 
has specified roles to participate in risk assessments in the risk routine, but it is also 
highlighted that the administrator of an operation has the highest responsibility to consider if 
other roles are necessary to participate. From this I argue that the initiative of risk assessments 
contains major gaps. It is highly dependent on the people participating in a given operation to 
independently using their experience and knowledge to assess whether other roles not 
specified in the risk system. This conflicts with Aven et al. (2008) which argues that different 
risks are supposed to be identified through a structured and systematic analysis and evaluation 
by people with necessary competency. 
 
Data shows that DomOil and InterOil identifies risk in two different manners. As DomOil 
seems firm in how they handle risks with frequent assessments, always trying to be ahead of 
themselves, how they identify risk is planned. InterOil differentiates in that manner. As it is 
evident from the data, InterOil can allow anyone to access the risk procedure. They also do not 
express a specific update routine for risk updates. Anybody with access have the possibility to 
edit in their risk system, and in such way the risk procedure contains gaps for how the company 
identifies and assesses risk. It can actually be in such manner that one of the company’s 
employees are travelling and suddenly are aware of something is not already expressed in the 
program. The person responsible can then access the program and edit in a new risk or 
perspective that the individual believes is important. The written procedure is also not always 
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relevant where responsible roles are defined, and instead it becomes the judgement of managing 
director and/or others for the actual topic is relevant. 
 
6.3. Critical risks  
In this chapter, the different strategic risks from the theory will be discussed. There are many 
considerations, and not all risks are as complete as what chapter 2 implied. Turning from 
strategic risks to critical risks is therefore an implication based on the following discussions.  
 
6.3.1. Strategy risk  
Some strategic goals are transparent within the organization, such as InterOil’s strategy to 
expand in the High North, or as DomOil’s scientific-based approach and developing right 
technologies. Theory shows that strategic risk originates from companies’ strategic objectives 
(Deloitte, 2013) and thus is often dependent on managers decision-making (Weller, 2008). 
This study has not been able to collect concrete data regarding the decision-making structure 
and continuous assessment of DomOil’s or InterOil’s follow up on corporate strategy. From 
the data gathered there are sprinkles of evidence that indicates that risk and strategy is actual 
in both companies. This is shown through most of the empirical data of the study and in the 
discussion. But it is relevant to point out that neither of DomOil or InterOil has emphasized 
strategy alone as a risk.  
 
6.3.2. Reputational risk 
Reputational risk is as illuminated by theory as a growing concern amongst companies in the 
energy sector as well as in the general. Turning the focus of such, being aware of the enormous 
power stakeholders have, petroleum companies should create a response for different events. 
Different stakeholders are influenced by perceptions, and it is challenging to control as it 
infiltrates from many holds at different times. It does not necessarily be because of an accident 
or hazard, but with increasing focus on Arctic and how the climate is (perceived) fragile, makes 
the companies present there needing to justify their presence there. The striking power of social 
media enables voices and perceptions travels fast and DomOil repeatedly during the interview 
saw their social license to operate as one of the biggest risks for them overall. So, DomOil really 
focuses on the impact reputation has.  Deloitte (2013) points out how stakeholders are 
influenced by reputation, and the consequences of such, can be of huge impact. It can reduce 
investors willingness to invest, it can create resistance by NGOs and public opinions- and if 
these become big enough it can reduce the possibility for DomOil to operate in specific areas. 
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The domino effect by one stakeholder blowing up something (most likely) negative regarding 
a petroleum company, can be enormous and uncontrollable for DomOil. Throughout one of the 
interviews, DomOil turned to the influence of perceptions in aspects of different stakeholders. 
In for example risks related politics was emphasized because of the great influence perceptions 
have. The regulatory system, and perceptions about climate change, creates a huge risk seen 
from DomOil’s perspective. How words are being spread quickly- voices that are not 
necessarily from a scientific- or facts-based stance and are being heard. This makes it hard for 
DomOil’s operations to be socially accepted. Reputational risk is emphasized by DomOil in 
many different aspects, and they are strictly conscious about the major influence it has.  
 
It is not only the public and NGOs who becomes a risk, but all aspects. Cases of reports made 
which gets a stamp by actors regarded as experts or authorities, but where the report is not 
necessarily reflect latest research such as the case of the Arctic Council. For the international 
company reputational risk is present, and they are aware that if reputation is lost it is challenging 
to gain back. Their focus seems though to be mostly in relation to recruitment and perceptions 
about their mother country. InterOil on the other hand focus more on the perceptions about their 
country of origin and how this influence the general perception of people, and how this in turn 
influence their possibilities for recruitment. Only once during the interviews was it highlighted 
by one of the respondents from InterOil that they need to be careful with their reputation, 
because once it is lost, it is hard to restore. According to Deloitte (2013) an increasing concern 
in the energy sector for reputational risk has appeared the last years as it is harder for companies 
to control. DomOil seems to be very well aware of what Deloitte (2013) found in their studies 
where reputation risk can easily escalate to a huge strategic crisis. Neither of the companies 
does not necessarily need to focus on the customers in such way Deloitte (2013) emphasize, but 
being aware of how perceptions infiltrate people, and in such turn through political risks (hence 
debates) and the domino effect on all stakeholders, is for DomOil of high importance. As this 
is so evident in DomOil’s work, planning, and discussions, they are focusing on managing 
reputation risk. As DomOil is focusing on stakeholders, they also focus on how they can 
influence these perceptions and are aware of the responsibility they have. As Power (2004) 
points out management of strategies, and use resources in areas such as legal system and social 
media, is important for reputational risk management.  
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6.3.3. Climate risk  
It is evident in the data that climate is not perceived as any major risk by neither DomOil or 
InterOil. I therefore argue that climate risk cannot be seen as a critical risk in this study. The 
expert from the Norwegian authorities did neither focus much on climate as a high risk, but 
emphasized that the demands from the authorities put on petroleum companies are significant. 
All in all the closest one gets too risky elements is the eco system, and physical factors such as 
remoteness, icing, polar lows and darkness. Yes, the Norwegian Barents Sea is much debated 
from all holds, and in many cases the negative influence petroleum companies have with their 
presence is in focus. The potential of major risks are present but for DomOil and InterOil these 
risks are not related to the Norwegian Barents Sea exclusively, but the Arctic as a whole poses 
physical challenges. Both companies actually emphasize that the Norwegian Barents Sea is a 
very attractive place to be because of the shallow ground, and milder climate (compared to other 
Norwegian offshore areas).  
 
6.3.4. Economic risk 
Regarding economical risk neither companies puts this as a risk focused on. As one of the 
respondents from InterOil highlights; it is not much they can do about the macroeconomic 
changes and challenges. In the same turn the same respondents focuses on the Norwegian 
Barents Sea being a predictable and attractive place to be, amongst other reasons because of the 
Norwegian taxation system and the area for being less sensitive to changes in an economic and 
financial manner. DomOil does not highlight any specific economic factors (other than higher 
transportation cost on toilet paper) as a strategic risk other than conducting certain thorough 
valuations before applying to areas. One can speculate that it is because of the same reasons as 
InterOil; it is nothing that neither of the companies roar over and in that manner according to 
theory that suggests economic risk as an external shock that can increase the vulnerability 
(Toksöz, 2014).  
 
6.3.5. Regulatory risk 
In general InterOil has a risk matrix which has an overview of compliance, and risks are 
measured in terms of “acceptable”, “controllable” or if does not involve any risk for the 
company at all. The financial aspect if the Norwegian government decides to raise their CO2 
taxation can become a risk. InterOil’s focus is on harmonization of regulations cross-borders. 
DomOil focuses on the competing risk and how different authorities can influence the 
company’s operating path in the Barents Sea based on their different views. The regulatory 
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authorities might change regulations based on political factors and/or new research available, 
but it is not emphasized in particular for any of the companies. As highlighted by the expert in 
chapter “4.3.” any change in the regulatory framework does not seem to be around the corner. 
Petroleum companies operating in the Norwegian Barents Sea needs to follow the requirements, 
and as these highly depend on the petroleum acting responsible and thorough. As Toksöz (2014) 
illuminates regulatory risk to be the complexity of a hotchpotch of regulatory frameworks, it 
might not be too strange that this is not emphasized in an especial high degree by DomOil or 
InterOil.   
 
6.3.6. Political risk 
Even though data shows that both DomOil and InterOil sees Norway as a predictable country 
to conduct business in, and the indications for it to continue are there, DomOil’s point of 
institutions competing instead of cooperating. If this is a trend that continues, it might become 
a risk. Such as the case with the Norwegian Environmental Agency can become a real political 
risk as well as economic as it can make real influence on valuations made by the petroleum 
company. Also as the government party changes every fourth-year agreements from previous 
governments might be changed, and is something both DomOil and InterOil highlights as a 
risk. In the case of InterOil it is as the theory shows, political risk is not viewed as an important 
country risk with mature political institutions (Toksöz, 2014). Another aspect which DomOil is 
that lobbying is not especially acceptable in Norway as it is in the USA. It is not expressed as 
a political risk, but is something the company needs to consider in their risk management.  
 
Both DomOil and InterOil highlights cooperation as an important step for petroleum companies 
to develop in the Barents Sea. There are some political challenges. DomOil focuses more on 
the competition between institutions in the Arctic areas that may become a risk for companies 
operating there. The example provided is that some authorities having regulatory and political 
power might not be clear in their communication. This can become an obstacle which is 
exemplified in chapter “5.1.4.5.”. In the same turn, if these institutions behave in a predictable 
manner- which both InterOil and DomOil in generally sees the Norwegian actual institutions to 
do- uncertainty for companies are reduced. This might also be underlined from the what is 
written in chapter “4.2.” about Norway and their long-term strategy where the Norwegian 
government focus on reinforcement of cross-border relationships. 
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The Norwegian Barents Sea is an area for international business, and for actors operating there 
many uncertainties exists. There are differences in Norwegian conditions compared to other 
countries where both the international company as well as the domestic company, which has 
cross-border operations, highlights Norway and its regulatory authorities to be cooperative, 
clinical and objective. Considering the environmental uncertainties Miller & Waller (2003) 
highlights- general environment, industry and firm specific- risk can be identified. As the 
international company highlights, and perceived as the biggest risk interpreted from the 
interviews, is harmonization in the general environment. Cross-border resources cannot be used 
without any more fuss, and without a harmonization of regulations between Norway and 
neighbor countries in the Norwegian Barents Sea can hinder utilizing the resources. Within the 
industry risks the domestic company is conscious on their actions in the Barents Sea. The whole 
industry might be influenced if the company doesn’t fulfill its responsible role in the Arctic, 
and even though it is reflected as a risk for the company, it is in its whole a risk for all companies 
operating in the oil and gas industry 
 
6.3.7. Country risk: 
A foreign company faces many different risks when internationalizing, but data shows that 
InterOil has not emphasized any specific risks related to country risk. I argue that this is because 
of an incremental adoption to the Norwegian offshore. For now, InterOil is a licensee holder, 
and therefore has shared responsibility with other petroleum companies in the Norwegian 
Barents Sea. Risks might change as entry modes change highlighted by Ahmed et al., (2002) 
which is influenced by change in strategic decisions. In general, from chapter 5 it is evident that 
InterOil commend the Norwegian oil industry to have an openness and cooperative stance. 
Being an international actor where the mother company has set its requirements from another 
country’s stance, the international company has to follow both the Norwegian requirements as 
well as its mother company. It could be seen as risk, as limitation or restrictions that Ahmed et 
al. (2002) highlights as possible international risks may occur, but InterOil has not specified 
this as risk. As the Norwegian regulatory framework is formed as mentioned in the previous 
paragraphs, with a more stretch but firm approach, InterOil has not highlighted any perceived 
specific risks. Only highlighted by InterOil is differences in for example leader- and 
preparedness-structures, and sees the harmonization of regulatory frameworks as a possible 
show enabler.  
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Figure 3: Main SRM findings- political and reputational risk 
 
6.4. Long- and short-term management of critical risks 
Enterprise risk management (ERM) focuses on a holistic approach to risk handling, and viewing 
the company in a wholesome manner. Risk are not necessarily approached separately based on 
expected duration, but rather by continuous work across business units and top-down, bottom-
up (escalator) communication. As strategy and strategic objectives of a company is concerned 
with long-term thinking, the combination of ERM and strategic risk management follows this 
lead. Handling such risk is not necessarily done within a short period of time, but starting early 
to be prepared and equipped for what can turn into future risks- hence critical risks. This chapter 
will discuss how DomOil and InterOil manage their critical risks.  
 
The findings in this study shows that DomOil has a long-term management of selected critical 
risks, whilst InterOil has a short-term management of selected critical risks. I argue this because 
data shows that DomOil has a solid strategy for working in the Arctic as they have put down a 
lot of resources assessing that area. As one of the respondents highlighted DomOil has 
enormous competency on the areas located within the Arctic(s). DomOil expresses a high focus 
on long-term risk regarding the Arctic as a strategy. As one of the respondents pointed out; 
DomOil needs to handle future risks already now. By engaging in industry organizations, and 
having a cooperative attitude towards the Arctic Council providing them with valuable industry 
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input, strongly indicates long-term engagement and management. As DomOil has put down 
human resources to handle Arctic aspects, it provides some sort of predictability in a somehow 
unpredictable environment. These resources have a dynamic and responsive role in the 
corporate strategy and within the company as a whole. This also fits with the enterprise risk 
management picture enabling the company to have a broad risk-based approach which Mikes 
(2009) emphasized in her study where other aspects such as non-financial and strategic 
objectives are included.  
 
InterOil, as it is a daughter company of a foreign oil and gas producer/distributor, created its 
own strategy with a basis in the mother’s strategy. Their strategy is in support of the mother 
company’s strategy, and developing the business strategy was done through many internal 
workshops. Doing a traditional strength, weakness, opportunity and threat (SWOT)-analysis 
led to illuminate the main risk elements, and by hiring an external actor to do a benchmarking 
of their business strategy towards other company’s business strategy, it seems to enable the 
international company to fortify their position and continuously work on their competitive 
advantage; differentiation. InterOil has much experience and knowledge from the Arctic areas 
and sees this a highly important competitive advantage when applying for licenses in those 
areas. In addition, InterOil has given the mother company’s existence, experience and 
knowledge s a high position in their strategic focus and in that way being able to differentiate 
in a competitive market. Even though strategy in itself should be long-term approach, InterOil 
does not express much that indicates a long-term management of critical risks and the 
engagement seems rather short-term from the data.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusion  
The aim of this study has been to answer the research questions: 
“How does petroleum companies identify and manage critical risks in the Barents Sea?” 
 
To answer such a research question two problem statements were addressed: 
“How does petroleum companies approach enterprise risk management and how are risks 
identified?” and the second one “What strategic risks are perceived to be critical and how are 
these managed?” 
 
This study will make two main contributions: Firstly, I claim that both the domestic and the 
international company have a holistic approach to ERM, but still the risk identification process 
may tend towards being deliberate or accidental. What DomOil expresses through their 
systematic approach to risk identification indicates a of high degree of control resulting in a 
deliberate risk identification. InterOil as well have frequent meetings and risk assessments, but 
even though their procedure and system is actively managed and used, their risk identification 
seems also to happen while employees are traveling, during ordinary conversations, and by 
enabling both internal actors as well as external actors to edit their procedure. This way risk 
identification, in addition to being planned also gives the impression of being accidental. They 
have their procedures with roles explicitly defined, but as the manager in InterOil points out: 
sometimes other roles need to participate instead, or in addition, to those already defined. In 
such case it is the judgement of the person responsible for the explicitly action who will make 
the decisions need taking.  
 
Secondly, reputation and political risks are perceived to be the most critical strategic risks by 
the two case companies and they tend to be either short- or long-term managed. It is evident 
that reputational risk is of great focus in DomOil, and they are very conscious the major 
influence it has. Perceptions amongst ordinary people, organizations and political parties are of 
high importance. In turn, the domino effect perception might have on stakeholders is a critical 
risk that needs to be long-term managed. Even though there might not be a final solution for 
how companies handle reputational risk, an emphasize of the matter is of high relevance. 
Perceptions is a real threat, and an increase of focus on the matter should therefore be present. 
DomOil has put down much resources in risk management, to carry out measures to handle 
risks in a strategic and long-term aspect by assessing the Arctic, communicating with all 
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business levels and leaving nothing to change. In addition to this, by being consistently focused 
on having a scientific-based approach to its operations they provide organizations such as the 
Arctic Council and BaSEC with valuable input DomOil has a strong commitment in their own 
operations as well as the industry itself. InterOil on the other hand has a corporate strategy that 
supports the mother company’s strategy, and their incentive to develop in the Arctic seems to 
have its base in their mother company’s strategy. The expression the company then provides 
under such terms is a short-term approach. They are participating in forums absorbing 
information and providing their knowledge and expertise. But in general, InterOil gives an 
impression that a long-term approach is not present.   
  
The framework for the study including the findings is summarized in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4: Illustration of main findings 
 
One surprise finding was how the Arctic physical environment in the Norwegian Barents Sea 
was not perceived as risk by either of the companies. Both DomOil and InterOil expresses 
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that the area is noted as workable and a low risk area, and the environmental aspects is not 
emphasized by any of the respondents. Yes, they need to consider the environmental impact 
such as infrastructure, remoteness and how their operations influence the ecosystem there, but 
other than that the Barents Sea do not propose any special hinders. It is manageable.  
Therefore, the Norwegian Barents Sea is a very attractive area for the petroleum companies to 
invest and operate in.  
 
7.1. Implications  
To identify risks according to the corporate strategy and the strategic management acting will 
enable the company to discover risks that might occur in the future already now and hinder 
them from becoming a major disaster. All petroleum companies, whether it is in the Norwegian 
Barents Sea or the Canadian or Russian Arctic much of the same challenges are faced and the 
stakes are high for everyone.  Perceptions through stakeholders such as ordinary people, 
organizations and political parties develop fast, and what one may call the domino effect if a 
petroleum company has an accident can, and probably will, be fatal for the whole petroleum 
industry. We have experienced and observed the major publicity and debates from Deepwater 
Horizon, Exxon Valdez and even the helicopter accident in Norway last year, destroying lives 
of innocent people. These damaged the reputation of the whole petroleum industry.  
 
This thesis was set to gain a broader view on how petroleum companies identify Arctic high 
stakes. Limiting it to the area of the Norwegian Barents Sea has shown that both the nation 
Norway as a petroleum nation and companies operating in the Norwegian offshore has a great 
responsibility. Practical implications from accidents and disasters in the Norwegian offshore 
can eventually result in foreign actors leaving the Norwegian petroleum industry. As the 
economies from this industry are extremely important for Norway the effects will influence the 
whole nation. Further the practical implications for this study is illuminating critical strategic 
risk and its importance in handling risk. This should be put on corporate agenda in petroleum 
companies as fast as even possible.   
 
7.2. Limitations 
Since I am no expert on the Arctic nor an experienced scientist this study must be seen for what 
it is- a final research paper in the program of master of science in business. The research period 
is from January to June and the time restriction is fairly present and controlling. To gain access 
to information for this study requires that central people in the company are willing to share 
68 
information- information that is not always possible to share in terms of it being visible, or 
because it may revile company strategies that might be held more closely at the company’s 
heart. This study is not set as the final solution on what petroleum companies should manage 
its strategic risk. It is rather a study on what two petroleum companies, one domestic and one 
international, does and what risk factors there are and which the company gives precedence to. 
The subject is very broad and contains many different factors. This study may be seen as a 
scratch on the surface. Further research to gain an even better understanding of the phenomenon 
I studied I suggest two distinct possibilities: #1: Interview all top-level managers in the given 
company, and managers at different business units. This will provide a higher degree of insight 
in managers decision-making and a greater understanding of risk identification and 
management according to strategic objectives. #2: Conducting a thorough longitudinal case 
study over several years, where strategies, forecasting and other corporate aspects are developed 
and challenged, this would have contributed to an even higher degree of understanding. I 
encourage anyone interested in this phenomenon to study it further. And maybe for the benefit 
of safety and further prosperity there are many aspects that not only could but should be more 
illuminated in academic literature.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Interview guide  
 
Anonymity  
Confidentiality  
Sound recorder 
 
Company perspective 
The respondents work tasks  
 
Risk and ERM 
What does [company name] consider at risk at a corporate level 
Risk definition 
Considerations regarding the terms risk and uncertainty 
Routines for handling risk 
Prioritization regarding these risks 
Risk as agenda in [company name] 
When is risk a risk? 
 
Strategic risk management 
Developing the corporate strategy regarding risk 
Risk considerations regarding  
 Political risk 
 Economic risk and the global market 
 Regulatory risk 
 Reputational risk 
 
The Barents Sea 
What kind of risk assessments is important in the Norwegian offshore? 
How are risks mapped/were mapped? 
How does the Norwegian offshore stand out compared to other offshore areas? 
 The Barents Sea different from other areas 
  Risk assessments  
 
 
 
 
 
